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EDITOR’S NOTE

T

he lead article in this issue gives you a chance to test your beliefs about
what leads to accurate—or to mistaken—eyewitness testimony. For 14
separate propositions on which research has given relatively clear
answers, researchers Richard Wise and Martin Safer summarize the conclusions
of researchers in the field. They also report the results of a survey of judges
that tested judicial knowledge in these 14 areas, plus a few others. Thus, a
review of this article will let you compare your knowledge both to other judges
and to the best research available today.
Wise and Safer argue that better safeguards against erroneous eyewitness
testimony are needed in light of the wrongful convictions proved by DNA testing; a great percentage of those appear to have
been based on erroneous eyewitness testimony.
It may not be surprising that Wise and Safer,
who are trained psychologists, conclude that
the best proven method of giving jurors sufficient education in this area is through the use
of expert testimony. And, to be sure, there may
also be other useful ways of approaching the
situation, some of which are also discussed in
the article. Nonetheless, Wise and Safer have
provided a useful overview of both the state of
judicial knowledge and present research, as
well as suggested actions the judiciary can take
to improve the situation.
The issue also contains Professor Charles Whitebread’s annual review of the
past year’s civil decisions by the United States Supreme Court. As Whitebread
notes, last year’s decisions included some blockbuster cases: the approval of
affirmative action, the striking down of bans on gay sexual relations, further
restriction on punitive damage awards, and a turnabout in the Court’s federalism revolution. All of the civil decisions of note are briefly reviewed in this
article. Last year’s criminal cases will be in our next issue.
I will note two other items that I hope you’ll review in this issue. The issue
includes an essay by David Battin and Stephen Ceci on children as witnesses.
They explain some of the communication difficulties encountered when standard English is used with kids between 3 and 10 years old. The essay provides
some useful background context to keep in mind when evaluating the statements of children. I would also ask you to read the American Judges
Association’s President’s Column on the facing page. It reprints the remarks
given by present president Michael McAdam at last year’s annual conference.
He provides a useful overview of what the AJA is, and of what it will be doing
this year. —SL
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Court Review, the quarterly journal of the American
Judges Association, invites the submission of unsolicited,
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President’s Column
Michael R. McAdam

The following is an edited version of remarks given at the
American Judges Association’s Annual Educational Conference in
Montreal on September 18, 2003.
I’m very honored and humbled to be your President. The
American Judges Association is a special organization with special attributes that no other judicial organization possesses. We
are uniquely an association of judges, run by judges, for judges.
And, we are uniquely an independent association of all judges.
Every other judicial organization that I’m aware of has either
a limited membership criterion (trial judges, Missouri judges,
juvenile judges, federal judges, appellate judges, presiding
judges, etc.) or it has an open membership but is controlled by
someone else and is divided into impervious sections. These
are all important and vital associations but not one of
them does what the AJA does. We exist to serve all
judges.
It doesn’t matter whether your jurisdiction is limited or general, trial or appellate. It doesn’t matter
whether you are the chief justice of the supreme
court of your state or a part-time municipal judge in
a town of 2,000 people—in either case you are a
judge and the AJA exists to help you become a better
judge. The AJA treats you equally. It doesn’t create
sealed compartments, divisions, or sections. It is open to allow
the free flow of ideas among all kinds of judges. This is a simple yet powerful organizing concept.
There are two people who particularly led me to become
involved in the leadership of this association, AJA past president, Judge Terry Elliott, and the late Kansas Supreme Court
Chief Justice, Richard Holmes, co-founder of the AJA. I particularly want you to remember Chief Justice Holmes, who began
his judicial career as a municipal court judge. He was an honest, fair, intelligent, and straight-talking man. He was a dynamo
of energy in a deceptively humble package. He was a true gentleman who had a tremendous influence on those he touched.
Judge Terry Elliott, also from Kansas, inspired me to pursue
the course of leadership that I have chosen in the AJA by his
example of hard work and dedication.
I had the privilege of working with both Chief Justice
Holmes and Judge Elliott on the AJA’s Long-Range Planning
Committee in the late 1990s (commissioned by then-president
John Mutter), along with other past and future presidents: Jerry
Gertner, the late Bob Anderson, Leslie Johnson, Chris
Williams, and Fran Halligan. One of the regular arguments we
had in that committee can be summarized in a question:

Is the AJA a serious, important judicial organization or is it a
fun-loving, social organization?
After all these years of going to AJA conferences and reading
Court Review I’m prepared to answer that question tonight.
The answer is . . . yes, both.
The AJA has for more than 40 years provided high-quality,
low-cost, timely educational programs for judges covering a
wide range of subjects of interest to a national judicial audience. Because our members serve on all levels of the state and
federal judiciary, we have, necessarily, provided a broad selection of judicial educational. This must be the ongoing mission
of the AJA.
If we were to not offer such programs at our annual conferences, very few judges would attend. If we didn’t publish articles of high quality in Court Review, very few judges
would remain members of AJA. Thus, it’s important that we pursue this worthy goal by continuing
to offer first-rate education at our conferences and
by publishing articles of substance in Court Review.
If we want the AJA to be the voice of the judiciary,
we must continue these worthy pursuits.
The AJA has provided something else for over
40 years at our annual and midyear meetings:
friendship. Perhaps, regarded by some as an unimportant goal of such meetings, to me it is the social contact and
camaraderie that marks an AJA gathering. It’s what I look forward to the most when I plan to attend an AJA event and I don’t
think my experience is unique. This camaraderie is a bond that
holds the AJA together and is therefore something to be
encouraged and continued.
During the next year we will continue to pursue both goals.
We will have a strong educational program at our annual conference in San Francisco in October 2004 with an emphasis on
the critical topic of judicial independence. Before that, we will
have a unique midyear meeting this winter in Savannah,
Georgia, sharing ideas and fun with our colleagues from the
National Association for Court Management.
During the next year, we will strengthen our important relationship with the National Center for State Courts when the
AJA’s Executive Committee meets in Williamsburg, Virginia, and
sees the National Center firsthand (for some committee members for the first time). At that meeting, the Executive Committee
will look to the future of the AJA and discuss the important
issues facing it. And through it all we will continue to make new
friends, renew old acquaintances, and have a great time. It
promises to be an important and fun year ahead for the AJA.
Spring 2003 - Court Review 3
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Children as Witnesses:
What We Hear Them Say May Not Be What They Mean
David B. Battin & Stephen J. Ceci

C

hildren present a special challenge
when they become participants in
the legal system. Jean Piaget said
that the work of a child is to play. That is
the basis for most interactions between
children and adults. The child plays and
the consequences of that play are unimportant to adult affairs—that is, unless
the child is under the age of 6 or 7 and is
required to serve as a witness. In that situation the consequences of what the
child says or chooses not to say can be
truly significant.
The special challenge for adults hearing the child’s testimony is to accurately
infer what the child means from the
words that are used. Entertaining the
possibility that the child could intend to
convey a meaning different from—and
even opposite to—what a legally trained
listener would mean using the same
words is crucial to maximizing the value
of the child’s testimony.
The child witness presents a double
bind for those conducting a forensic
interview. Young children produce a
higher percentage of accurate and relevant information in a free recall situation
in which they are merely asked to tell in
their words everything they remember,
without prompts, cues, or suggestions.
However, preschoolers produce little or
no information when simply asked to
“tell us what you remember.” The aggravation of this situations stems from the
demonstrated inability of these very
young children to use questions posed to
them as clues to what additional information is needed.
In a recent experimental investigation
of children’s reports of a wrongful act
they had seen on videotape, most children aged 3 to 10 years made a first reference to the perpetrator, who acted alone,
as “they.” In adult usage, “they” almost
always indicates more than one person.
The older children in this study were able
to refine their reference in response to
directive questions such as, “Do you
know which person did it?,” but a signif4 Court Review - Spring 2003

icant number of preschoolers never made
a singular reference.
Most interrogative experiences that
children have outside the legal system are
not carefully evaluated for consistency or
truth value. The adult who asks questions such as “What happened at daycare
today?” or “What did you do at Molly’s
birthday party?” have a “script” in mind
of what occurs during the typical event
(e.g., a typical birthday party or a typical
day at nursery school). Anything the
child says that fits the script goes unchallenged. It is usually not important to the
adult questioner whether the child
played with Legos today or on some
other day, or whether the child played
with Legos himself or watched a peer
play with them.
Courtroom communication differs
from everyday conversation in that it is
designed to promote shared context to a
very high degree. The codes and statutes
are available for everyone to read.
Evidence is shared through discovery.
Jurisprudence is an unusual venue that
employs the same language (i.e., semantics, syntax, and pragmatics) that is used
for other communication but often
defines terms differently and provides
exact and special meaning to words in the
general lexicon. This prescribed and
delimited mutual context facilitates the
process for those with access to it.
This is precisely why communication
between those trained in the law and
those without legal training can go awry.
Recognizing that even non-indoctrinated
adults have a high degree of variability in
their success with this system, children
are at a profound disadvantage. They not
only lack this specialized knowledge, but
they lack substantial general knowledge
of the world and certain language skills
we expect in adults. They are less likely
to admit they don’t understand a question, to correct an adult if the child’s
answer is misinterpreted, or to admit
they don’t know the answer to a question.
Perhaps the most obvious way that

communication can break down with
children is in semantics or word meaning. If a child is asked, “What color
jacket was the lady wearing?,” and she
answers, “Blue,” without hesitation, then
it is easy to accept that answer at face
value. Most three- and four-year-olds
know the names of all the primary colors,
but the percentage of those children who
can accurately match a color name to its
corresponding hue increases dramatically
between 36 months and 60 months.
Prepositions such as above, below,
behind, in front of, on, before, and after are
familiar to three- and four-year-olds, but
a significant percentage of these children
confuse the physical or temporal relationship represented by these words.
Prepositions such as on, with, and to have
multiple meanings, some of which are
acquired years before others. For example, the sense of on that locates an object
in space (“The book is on the table.”) is
acquired prior to the sense of on that
shows connections or relations between
things (“Did he have on his pajamas?”).
In turn, both these senses of the preposition are acquired years before the sense
that carries the meaning of an agent or
action (“Show me on the doll how he
touched you.”). The risk for a forensic
interviewer is to assume that the child
understands a question with a given word
because the word, although in her vocabulary, is not understood in the way the
interviewer employs it.
When it comes to temporal terms, the
situation is even dodgier. A child might
assent to the question, “Did that happen
before your birthday?” when the child’s
birthday is in July. Yet, the same child
might subsequently answer the question,
“Tell us again when that happened?”
with, “In August.” For many three- and
four-year-olds this couplet of answers
would not present a contradiction.
These examples illustrate the critical
bind encountered by those interviewing
young children. There is extensive scientific evidence that children provide the

most accurate information in a free recall
situation in which they are asked to tell
what they know about a situation without additional prompting from the interviewer. Unfortunately, most young children do not provide sufficient details
about events to allow a naïve listener to
reconstruct the episode. This is true even
in experimental situations that have been
designed to present the child with a relatively simple scenario, people with highly
salient physical characteristics, and a single salient event.
Presented with claims such as, “They
did something bad,” the interviewer is
compelled to resort to directive questions
to find out what was done and who did it.
As the interview proceeds and the child
asserts, “The lady did it,” directive questions with fewer options for response
need to be presented. If, in response to
the question, “Do you know what the
lady was wearing?,” the child says, “A
coat,” the stage has been set for the color
question, which the child recognizes
requires a single-word answer with a
finite set of options.
This bind becomes a double bind
when the witness is only three or four
years old. These children will predictably
provide the least information in free
recall—in our work, many often produce
no information at all. In addition, there
is a body of converging evidence that
these very young children lack the pragmatic skill to use the interviewer’s questions as evidence that they need to supply
more information. In the study mentioned earlier, three- and four-year-olds
produced response patterns during interviews that indicated they were not
responding to directive questions at all.
After asserting, “They did it,” successive
questions about who “did it” were
responded to with “the people,” “they,”
“those guys,” etc. Some of these children
eventually identified “they” as either a
solo man or a woman, illustrating the

very real risk that young preschoolers
will use a plural pronoun even though
they know an individual person is
responsible. Interestingly, very few of the
children in our study initially used clothing or other physical characteristics to
identify a singular definite reference (e.g.,
the man with the white shirt). One can
imagine the suspicions of a forensic interviewer when a child witness asserts that a
crime was perpetrated by “they” rather
than “he”—a barrage of follow-up questions to elicit possible unindicted perpetrators. Yet, it is a common characteristic
of preschoolers to mislabel singular perpetrators with a plural noun or pronoun.
Transcripts of depositions and incourt testimony include copious examples of exchanges in which children fail
to recognize potential ambiguity. For
instance, children often answer embedded questions such as, “Did you or did
you not…?” with “Yes” or “No.”
Children try to answer the questions that
are posed to them, even when they are
not precisely sure what information is
being requested. In such situations, the
miscommunication problem can be
masked by the adult assumption that
what people say is going to be relevant.
Most conversational responses could be
interpreted in a variety of ways if they
were context free. The success of communication requires that we interpret
what is said as if it is relevant in the present discourse context. If the context of
very young children is characteristically
divergent from the adult context, that
interpretation may be in error.
The key to anticipating the problems
in adult-child communication is to recognize that the child’s perspective is vastly
different from that of an adult. They have
less knowledge of the world, alternative
meanings for common words, different
responses to unknown versus powerful
people, less ability to reconstruct past
events in situ, and highly differential

approaches to using what is said to them
to evaluate what their discourse participant knows or does not know. Most children want to cooperate with an interviewer and will do their best to answer
the questions posed to them, with or
without understanding their import. It
seems incumbent on those charged with
the task of taking a statement from a
young child to be aware of these tendencies and to seek expert guidance in structuring their interview.

David B. Battin is a doctoral
candidate
in
human development at
Cornell University. His
research focuses on the
behavior of preschoolage children engaged in
discourse with an unfamiliar adult. He has coauthored manuscripts dealing with more general issues of
children’s testimony and served as a student
reviewer for a peer-reviewed journal.
Stephen J. Ceci is the
Helen L. Carr Professor
of Developmental Psychology at Cornell
University.
He
coauthored (with Maggie
Bruck) the 1995 book,
Jeopardy in the Courtroom: A Scientific Analysis of Children’s
Testimony, which won the prestigious
William James Book Prize awarded by the
American Psychological Association. Ceci’s
many honors include an NIH Research
Career Scientist award and a Senior
Fullbright-Hayes fellowship. He is the
author of more than 300 articles, chapters,
and books, mostly in the area of child intellectual development. Ceci serves on the editorial board of several scholarly journals.
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A Survey of Judges’
Knowledge and Beliefs
About Eyewitness Testimony
Richard A. Wise & Martin A. Safer

F

orensic DNA testing suggests that potentially large numbers of innocent persons are being convicted of crimes.1
Case studies conducted both prior to and following the
advent of DNA testing indicate that eyewitness error is at least
partially responsible for the majority of wrongful convictions.
Empirical research has shown which factors contribute to eyewitness error and has identified procedural changes that could
be made in the criminal justice system to significantly reduce
the number of erroneous eyewitness identifications.2
We report the results of a brief survey of what U.S. judges
know and believe about eyewitness testimony. The present
survey highlights what judges already know about these eyewitness factors and procedural changes and indicates what
additional knowledge judges may need to significantly reduce
the number of wrongful convictions.
THE NUMBER OF WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS

Although there is no precise figure, it is possible to suggest
lower and upper estimates for the annual number of wrongful
convictions in the Unites States. Almost 1 million persons
were convicted of felonies in the United States in 1998.3 Huff
surveyed criminal justice officials in Ohio and, based on their
answers, estimated that wrongful convictions occur in about 1
of every 200 felony criminal cases (.5%).4 Huff’s estimate
would translate into 5,000 wrongful felony convictions in
1998. However, DNA testing of criminal suspects suggests
that the percentage of wrongful convictions may be much
higher than .5%.
In 1995 a survey of public and private forensic laboratories
in the United States indicated that they had conducted DNA

Footnotes
Authors’ Note: This article is based on Richard A. Wise’s dissertation,
which was submitted in partial fulfillment of requirements for a doctoral degree in psychology awarded by the Catholic University of
America. The internet version of the survey may be viewed at
http://research.cua.edu/eyewitness. Correspondence concerning this
article should be addressed to Martin A. Safer, Department of
Psychology, Catholic University of America, Washington, DC 20064.
E-mail: Safer@cua.edu.
1. See generally, Donald A. Dripps, Miscarriages of Justice and the
Constitution, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 635 (1999).
2. See John C. Brigham et al., Disputed Eyewitness Identification
Evidence: Important Legal and Scientific Issues, 36 CT. REV.,
Summer 1999, at 12-25; see also Saul M. Kassin et al., On the
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tests in 21,621 criminal cases.5 DNA testing excluded suspects
in approximately 23% of the cases. The exclusion rate would be
about 27% if cases with inconclusive tests were omitted.
A number of studies have estimated that one-half of all persons charged with serious crimes are ultimately convicted.6
Accordingly, if the suspects cleared by DNA evidence are similar
to the suspects who would have been indicted prior to the widespread use of DNA testing, then there may have been a false conviction rate in the past of greater than 10% for cases where DNA
testing is now possible. Dripps asserts that DNA-exonerated
suspects are very similar to the persons who would have been
indicted prior to the use of DNA testing.7 More importantly,
Dripps argues that factors such as eyewitness error, which might
have led to wrongful indictments in DNA cases, continue to
produce wrongful indictments in the vast majority of criminal
cases where there is no testable biological evidence. A false conviction rate of 10% would imply almost 100,000 wrongful
felony convictions every year. Clearly, the high exclusion rates
in DNA testing of suspects, along with the well-publicized cases
of post-conviction DNA exonerations, challenge the presumption that wrongful convictions rarely occur. Indeed, they
strongly suggest that more innocent persons than previously
believed are being wrongfully convicted of felonies.
ERRONEOUS EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATIONS

Eyewitness error occurs in half or more of all wrongful convictions. Thus, Borchard reported that eyewitness error
occurred in 45% of 65 cases of wrongful conviction,8 Huff
found eyewitness error in nearly 60% of approximately 500
wrongful convictions,9 and Rattner concluded that eyewitness

3.

4.
5.

6.
7.
8.
9.

“General Acceptance” of Eyewitness Testimony Research: A New
Survey of the Experts, 56 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 405-16 (2001).
Criminal Sentencing Statistics (2002), U.S. Department of Justice,
Bureau of Statistics, http://www/ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/sent.htm (last
visited August 19, 2002).
C. Ronald Huff, Wrongful Conviction: Societal Tolerance of
Injustice, 4 RES. IN SOC. PROBS. & PUB. POL’Y 99-115 (1987).
Edward Connors et al., Convicted by Juries, Exonerated by Science:
Case Studies in the Use of DNA Evidence to Establish Innocence After
Trial, Dep’t Justice, National Institute of Justice (1996).
See e.g., Dripps, supra note 1.
Id.
EDWIN BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT (1932).
Huff, supra note 4.

error occurred in 52% of 205 wrongful convictions.10 These
wrongful convictions studies were conducted before the invention of DNA testing, and the different authors included some of
the same cases in their analyses. Scheck et al. analyzed 62 cases
where DNA evidence exonerated persons convicted of felonies,
and they found that mistaken identifications were involved in
52 of the 62 cases (84%).11 Seventy-seven witnesses in these 52
cases had erroneously identified the defendants as the perpetrators of the crimes. At trial, these witnesses undoubtedly
appeared very confident in their identifications.
EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON EYEWITNESS FACTORS

Over the past 30 years, researchers have documented extensively many factors and procedures that can affect the accuracy
of eyewitness identification.12 For example, researchers have
shown that the presence of a weapon can impair an eyewitness’s
ability to accurately identify the perpetrator’s face;13 that an
eyewitness’s confidence can be influenced by post-event experiences that are unrelated to identification accuracy;14 and that
a law officer who knows which member of a lineup or photo
array is the suspect can bias a witness’s selection.15 Researchers
have also developed new techniques for interviewing witnesses
that yield more complete reports, as well as identified simple
procedural changes that could be made in the criminal justice
system, which would reduce the number of eyewitness identification errors.16
The present study is the first to determine judges’ knowledge about a wide range of factors and procedures that affect
eyewitness accuracy. Judges also indicated what they believe
jurors know about eyewitness factors, and what legal safeguards they would permit attorneys to use to inform jurors
about the effects of eyewitness factors on identification accuracy. Judges’ answers to these two questions are important
because research indicates that jurors do not know how many
eyewitness factors affect identification accuracy.17 Research has
also shown that expert testimony is the only legal safeguard
that is effective in sensitizing jurors to eyewitness factors.18
Nonetheless, the most common reason judges give for excluding eyewitness expert testimony at trial is that the expert’s testimony is within the knowledge of the jury19 and, therefore,
“would not assist the trier of fact.”

10. Arye Rattner, Convicted But Innocent, 12 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 28393 (1988).
11. BARRY SCHECK ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE: FIVE DAYS TO EXECUTION
AND OTHER DISPATCHES FROM THE WRONGLY CONVICTED (2000).
12. See Gary Wells et al., From Lab to the Police Station: A Successful
Application of Eyewitness Research, 55 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 581-98
(2000).
13. Elizabeth Loftus et al., Some Facts about “Weapon Focus,” 11 LAW
& HUM. BEHAV. 55-62 (1987); see also Nancy M. Steblay, A MetaAnalytic Review of the Weapon Focus Effect, 16 LAW & HUM. BEHAV.
413-24 (1992).
14. See C. A. Elizabeth Luus & Gary Wells, The Malleability of
Eyewitness Confidence: Co-witness and Perseverance Effects, 79 J.
APPLIED PSYCHOL. 714-23 (1994); John S. Shaw, Increases in
Eyewitness Confidence Resulting from Postevent Questioning, 2 J.
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: APPLIED 126-46 (1996).
15. Mark R. Phillips et al., Double-Blind Photoarray Administration as

In summary, our surResearch has shown
vey may help identify
some facets of eyewitness that expert testimony
testimony where judges
is the only legal
need additional training.
safeguard that is
It may also give some
indication of how accu- effective in sensitizing
rately judges perceive
jurors to eyewitness
jurors’ knowledge of eyefactors.
witness testimony, and
how willing they are to
permit legal safeguards, including expert testimony.
METHOD

A request to complete a brief, anonymous ten-minute questionnaire on eyewitness testimony was distributed on the listserves of the American Judges Association and the Judicial
Division of the American Bar Association. Judges were
informed that they could complete the survey on the linked
website, print out the survey from the website and mail it, or
request a copy of the survey from its authors and then return it
by mail.
We obtained 143 completed questionnaires on the website
and 17 completed paper surveys, for a total sample of 160. The
respondents included 142 state judges, 10 federal judges, 7
retired judges, and 1 Indian tribal judge. There were 146 trial
judges, 6 appellate judges, and 8 (mainly the retired judges)
who did not indicate their current position. Prior to becoming
judges, 22 respondents had been prosecutors (14%), 42 had
been defense attorneys (26%), 57 had been both prosecutors
and defense attorneys (36%), and 39 had not practiced criminal law (24%). Respondents had practiced law for an average
of 13.96 years and had been on the bench for an average of
12.48 years.
The questionnaire covered many key issues about eyewitness testimony. The judges were asked to indicate their agreement or disagreement with 14 statements about eyewitness factors and procedures, to answer 4 other related questions, and to
provide personal background information that was summarized in the preceding paragraph. The eyewitness factors and
procedures in the 14 statements were selected because of strong

16.
17.

18.

19.

a Safeguard Against Investigator Bias, 84 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 94051 (1999).
See Wells, supra note 12.
See e.g., R. C. Lindsay et al., Mock Juror Belief of Accurate and
Inaccurate Witnesses, 13 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 333-39 (1989) [hereinafter Lindsay (1989)]; R. C. Lindsay et al., Can People Detect
Eyewitness Identification Accuracy Within and Across Situations?,
66 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 79-89 (1981) [hereinafter Lindsay (1981)];
Gary Wells et al., Accuracy, Confidence, and Juror Perceptions in
Eyewitness Identification, 64 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 440-48 (1979)
[hereinafter Wells (1979)].
See Steven D. Penrod & Brian L. Cutler, Preventing Mistaken
Convictions in Eyewitness Identification Trials, in PSYCHOLOGY AND
LAW: THE STATE OF THE DISCIPLINE 89-118 (Ronald Roesch et al.
eds., 1999).
Cindy J. O’Hagen, Note, When Seeing Is Not Believing: The Case for
Eyewitness Expert Testimony, 81 GEO. L.J. 741, 758 (1993).
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empirical evidence on how they affect identification accuracy,
and because they describe issues that occur frequently in criminal trials. For 5 of the eyewitness statements, the judges also
indicated how they believed the average juror would answer
the statement and what legal safeguards they would permit
attorneys to use to inform jurors about the effects of the eyewitness factors on identification accuracy. For 8 of the eyewitness statements (Statements 3, 5-11), we were able to compare
the judges’ responses to those of 64 experts on eyewitness testimony.20 The experts answered whether the eyewitness statement was sufficiently reliable for an expert to testify about in
court and whether knowledge of how the factor affects identification accuracy is a matter of common sense.
RESULTS

We first report the judges’ responses to the 14 statements
about eyewitness factors and the 4 related questions, and where
appropriate, we provide a brief justification for the correct
answer. We have renumbered the statements from the original
survey to improve the clarity and conciseness of this report. In
Tables 1, 2, and 5, an asterisk next to a response indicates a correct answer. Percentages were rounded to the nearest whole
number and, therefore, may not total exactly 100% for every
statement. In calculating percent correct, we combined the
judges’ responses of “strongly agree” and “agree,” as well as the
responses of “strongly disagree” and “disagree,” because judges
rarely responded, “strongly agree” or “strongly disagree.”

EYEWITNESS STATEMENTS 1-6

1. It is significantly harder for a witness of a crime to recognize a perpetrator who is wearing a hat during the
commission of a crime than a perpetrator who is not
wearing a hat. Even simple disguises can reduce identification accuracy.21 A hat disguises hair and facial shape,
which are important cues to recognizing a person’s face.22
Only 45% of the judges correctly answered that it is significantly harder to recognize a perpetrator who is wearing a
hat. (See Table 1, row 1.)
2. A witness’s ability to recall minor details about a crime
is a good indicator of the accuracy of the witness’s identification of the perpetrator of the crime. Memory for
minor or peripheral details is inversely related to eyewitness
accuracy, because an eyewitness who attends to peripheral
details has fewer resources available to process the perpetrator’s face.23 Only 24% of the judges correctly disagreed with
this eyewitness statement. The majority of judges (57%)
mistakenly believed that an eyewitness’s ability to recall
peripheral details about a crime indicates that the witness
has a better memory than a witness who cannot recall
peripheral details.
3. An eyewitness’s perception and memory for an event
may be affected by his or her attitudes and expectations.
Expectancies can exert a powerful influence on attention
and recall of relevant information.24 In the Kassin survey,

TABLE 1
DISTRIBUTION OF JUDGES’ RESPONSES TO EYEWITNESS STATEMENTS 1-6

Topic
1. Effects of a hat
2. Minor details
3. Attitudes & expectations
4. Conducting lineups
5. Effects of postevent information
6. Confidence-accuracy

Strongly agree

Agree

Neither

Disagree

Strongly disagree

6%*
4%
26%*
25%*
17%*

39%*
53%
69%*
38%*
67%*

50%
20%
4%
18%
8%

6%
22%*
1%
20%
6%

0%
2%*
1%
1%
1%

3%

31%

34%

28%*

5%*

Note: The asterisks next to the responses in the table indicate the correct answers.

20. See Kassin, supra note 2.
21. See generally K. E. Patterson & A. D. Baddeley, When Face
Recognition Fails, 3 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: HUM. LEARNING &
MEMORY 406-17 (1977); Peter N. Shaprio & Steven D. Penrod,
Meta-Analysis of Facial Identification Studies, 100 PSYCHOL. BULL.
139-56 (1986).
22. Brian L. Cutler et al., Improving the Reliability of Eyewitness
Identification: Putting Context into Context, 72 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL.
629-37 (1987); Brian L. Cutler et al., The Reliability of Eyewitness
Identifications: The Role of System and Estimator Variables, 11 LAW
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& HUM. BEHAV. 223-58 (1987).
23. See Gary Wells & Michael R. Leippe, How Do Triers of Fact Infer
the Accuracy of Eyewitness Identifications? Using Memory for
Peripheral Detail Can Be Misleading, 66 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 682-87
(1981); BRIAN L. CUTLER & STEVEN D. PENROD, MISTAKEN
IDENTIFICATIONS: THE EYEWITNESS, PSYCHOLOGY, AND THE LAW
(1995).
24. Edward R. Hirt et al., Expectancies and Memory: Inferring the Past
from What Must Have Been, in HOW EXPECTANCIES SHAPE
EXPERIENCE 93-124 (Irving Kirsch ed., 1999).

92% of the eyewitness experts agreed that this statement
was sufficiently reliable to present in court.25 Of the judges,
95% agreed with this statement, and, therefore, there was no
significant difference between the experts’ and judges’
responses to this statement.
4. A police officer who knows which member of the lineup
or photo array is the suspect should not conduct the
lineup or photo array. A lineup administrator can intentionally or unintentionally influence a witness to select the
suspect from a lineup or photo array.26 In the survey, 63% of
the judges correctly answered that a lineup administrator
should not know who is the suspect. However, in most
criminal cases, the police officer who conducts the lineup
knows which lineup member is the suspect, and the police
are reluctant to change this practice.27
5. Eyewitness testimony about an event often reflects not
only what a witness actually saw but information
obtained later on. Post-event information can influence
eyewitnesses’ description of a crime, their description of the
perpetrator of the crime, and which member of a lineup
they identify as the perpetrator.28 Altogether, 84% of the
judges correctly agreed with this statement, as did 94% of
the eyewitness experts, which is not a significant difference.

6. At trial, an eyewitness’s confidence is a good predictor of
his or her accuracy in identifying the defendant as the
perpetrator of the crime. This is a particularly important
statement because jurors rely heavily on eyewitness confidence in evaluating identification accuracy.29 However, by
the time of trial, eyewitness confidence has little probative
value because of the many post-identification factors that
affect confidence, but have no effect on identification accuracy.30 (See also statement 5 for the effects of post-event
information and statement 7 for a discussion of “confidence
malleability.”) Almost all eyewitness experts would disagree
with Statement 6.31 In sharp contrast, there was little consensus among the judges on this critical question. Only
33% of the judges correctly disagreed, 34% wrongly agreed,
and 34% neither agreed nor disagreed. Clearly, the correct
answer to this very important issue is not a matter of “common sense.”
EYEWITNESS STATEMENTS 7-11

For eyewitness statements 7 through 11, the judges
answered for themselves, as well as for how they believed the
average juror would respond to the eyewitness statement. In
Table 2, the percentages in italics before the slash are what the
judges believed about the eyewitness statement. Percentages
after the slash are what the judges believed the average juror

TABLE 2
DISTRIBUTION OF JUDGES’ RESPONSES TO EYEWITNESS STATEMENTS 7-11,
AND WHAT JUDGES BELIEVE JURORS KNOW ABOUT THESE STATEMENTS

Topic
7. Confidence malleability
8. Weapon focus
9. Mug-shot-induced bias
10. Lineup format
11. Forgetting curve

Generally true

Generally false

Jurors do not know

90%* / 36%
69%* / 24%
74%* / 38%
19%* / 4%
31%* / 18%

1% / 4%
4% / 9%
4% / 3%
15% / 6%
25% / 13%

—- / 32%
—- / 37%
—- / 28%
—- / 29%
—- / 30%

Note: The asterisks next to the responses in the table indicate the correct answers. The percentages in italics before the slash are what the judges believed
about the eyewitness statements. The percentages after the slash are what the judges believed the average juror thinks about the statement. “I don’t know”
responses by judges, either as to their own knowledge or indicating they did not know what jurors would understand about an issue, are not reported here.

25. Kassin, supra note 2.
26. See Lynn Garrioch & C. A. Elizabeth Brimacombe, Lineup
Administrator’s Expectations: Their Impact on Eyewitness
Confidence, 25 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 299-315 (2001); Phillips,
supra note 15.
27. Wells, supra note 12.
28. See Robert E. Christiaansen et al., Influencing Eyewitness
Descriptions, 7 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 59-65 (1983); Elizabeth F.
Loftus & Edith Greene, Warning: Even Memory for Faces May Be
Contagious, 4 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 323-34 (1980); ELIZABETH F.
LOFTUS, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY (1979).
29. Gary Wells et al., Eyewitness Identifications Procedures:
Recommendations for Lineups and Photospreads, 22 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 603-47 (1998).
30. John S. Shaw III & Kimberley A. McClure, Repeated Postevent

Questioning Can Lead to Elevated Levels of Eyewitness Confidence,
20 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 629-53 (1996); Wells, supra note 29.
31. The Kassin experts actually rated the statement “An eyewitness’s
confidence is not a good predictor of his or her identification
accuracy.” Kassin, supra note 2. In the judges’ survey, we slightly
rewrote the statement as well as added the introductory phrase “at
trial” because judges are likely to be confronted with this issue at
trial rather than in the investigatory phase of a case. Altogether,
87% of the experts thought that the lack of a strong relationship
between confidence and accuracy was a reliable enough fact to
present in courtroom testimony. Because witness confidence
becomes even less predictive of accuracy over time (see statement
7 on confidence malleability), we suspect that nearly 100% of the
experts would have disagreed with the modified confidence-accuracy statement in the judges’ survey.
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thinks about the statement. The correct answer for each of
these five statements is “generally true.” (See Tables 2 and 3.)
7. An eyewitness’s confidence can be influenced by factors
that are unrelated to identification accuracy. Factors such
as post-event questioning, witness preparation and rehearsal,
and confirming feedback can greatly increase a witness’s confidence without a corresponding change in a witness’s accuracy.32 In Kassin’s survey, 95% of the eyewitness experts
agreed with this statement,33 as did 90% of the judges in the
current survey. This nearly unanimous agreement about the
effects of “confidence malleability” contrasts with the judges’
response to statement 6, where only 33% of the judges correctly disagreed with the statement, “At trial, an eyewitness’s
confidence is a good indicator of identification accuracy.”
Judges apparently do not fully appreciate the extent that confidence malleability can undermine the value of eyewitness
confidence as a predictor of eyewitness accuracy at trial.
Only 10% of the experts believed that the average juror
would be aware of the relationship between confidence malleability and eyewitness accuracy. In contrast, 36% of the
judges believed the average juror would think statement 7
to be generally true. Thus, a significantly larger percentage
of judges than experts thought that the average juror would
know the correct answer to this statement.
8. The presence of a weapon can impair an eyewitness’s
ability to accurately identify the perpetrator’s face. A
weapon impairs an eyewitness’s ability to identify the perpetrator of a crime.34 In the Kassin survey, 87% of the eyewitness experts agreed with this statement, and 34% of the
experts believed that understanding the statement was a
matter of common sense (i.e., the average juror would

understand the effect of weapon focus on eyewitness accuracy).35 Of the judges, 69% correctly believed this statement
was true, and 24% believed that jurors would think the
statement was true. In short, the percentage of judges who
agreed with this statement was significantly less than the
percentage of experts. However, their beliefs about whether
the average juror would know the correct answer did not
differ significantly from the experts.
9. Exposure to mug shots of a suspect increases the likelihood
that the witness will later choose the suspect from a lineup.
Researchers have shown that a witness who views a mug shot
of a suspect is more likely to later choose that person from a
lineup, in comparison to a witness who did not see the mug
shot.36 In Kassin’s survey, 95% of the eyewitness experts agreed
that there was a mug shot induced bias, and 13% indicated that
understanding it was a matter of common sense.37 Of the
judges, 74% agreed with the statement, and 38% responded
that the average juror was aware of the mug-shot-induced bias.
Thus, a significantly smaller percentage of judges than experts
agreed with this statement, but, a significantly larger percentage
of judges than experts believed that understanding the mugshot-induced bias is a matter of common sense.
10. Witnesses are more likely to misidentify someone in a
culprit-absent lineup when it is presented in a simultaneous (i.e., all members of a lineup are present at the
same time) as opposed to a sequential procedure (i.e., all
members of a lineup are presented individually). The traditional simultaneous lineup encourages witnesses to make
a relative judgment about which lineup member most
closely resembles the perpetrator of the crime.38 In sequential lineups, the eyewitness makes a yes-no decision about a

TABLE 3
DISTRIBUTION OF EXPERTS’ RESPONSES TO EYEWITNESS STATEMENTS 7-11,
AND WHAT THEY BELIEVE JURORS KNOW ABOUT THESE STATEMENTS (KASSIN, SUPRA NOTE 2).

Topic

The eyewitness statement is sufficiently reliable
for an expert witness to present in court.

7. Confidence malleability
8. Weapon Focus
9. Mug-shot-induced bias
10. Lineup format
11. Forgetting curve

95%
87%
95%
81%
83%

The correct answer is a
matter of common sense.
10%
34%
13%
0%
29%

Note: Copyright © 2001 by the American Psychological Association. Adapted with permission.

32. See generally Wells, supra note 29; Shaw & McClure, supra note
30; Gary Wells & Amy L. Bradfield, Distortions in Eyewitnesses’
Recollections: Can the Postidentification-Feedback Effect Be
Moderated?, 10 PSYCHOL. SCI.138-44 (1999).
33. Kassin, supra note 2.
34. See Steblay, supra note 13; Patricia A. Tollestrup et al., Actual
Victims and Witnesses to Robbery and Fraud: An Archival Analysis,
in ADULT EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY: CURRENT TRENDS AND
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DEVELOPMENTS 144-160 (David F. Ross et al. eds., 1994).
35. Kassin, supra note 2.
36. See e.g., Evan Brown et al., Memory for Faces and Circumstances of
Encounter, 53 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 311-18 (1977).
37. Kassin, supra note 2.
38. See R. C. Lindsay & Gary Wells, Improving Eyewitness
Identification from Lineups: Simultaneous Versus Sequential Lineup
Presentations, 70 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 556-64 (1985).

lineup member without knowing the number or characteristics of other members in the lineup. Studies that have compared simultaneous and sequential lineups have consistently
found that sequential lineups significantly lower the risk of
false identifications compared to simultaneous lineups without reducing the number of accurate identifications.39
In Kassin’s survey, 81% of the experts agreed with a
slightly different phrasing of this statement, and 0%
thought it was a matter of common sense.40 Of the judges,
67% neither agreed nor disagreed with the statement,
which suggests that most of the judges are unfamiliar with
the differences between sequential and simultaneous lineups.41 Only 19% of the judges correctly agreed with the
statement, and 4% of the judges thought the average juror
would agree. Thus, the percentage of experts and judges
who agreed with this statement differed significantly.
However, a similar negligible percentage of experts and
judges believed that the answer to this statement was a
matter of common sense.

of the judges and experts
[T]he responses
differed significantly on
weapon focus, exposure to of the judges and
mug shots, lineup format,
experts differed
and the forgetting curve.
significantly on
Moreover, a significantly
weapon focus,
larger percentage of judges
than experts believed that exposure to mug
the correct answers to two
shots, lineup
of the five statements (conformat, and the
fidence malleability and
forgetting curve.
exposure to mug shots)
were a matter of common
sense. However, for each of the five statements, judges were
much more likely to know the correct answer themselves
than to believe that the average juror would know the correct answer. Thus the judges, like the eyewitness experts,
believe that knowledge of factors and procedures affecting
eyewitness testimony is not just a matter of common sense.

11. The rate of memory loss for an event is greatest right
after an event and then levels off over time. This statement describes the relatively rapid loss of memory for the
details of an event, such as a crime, which takes place shortly
after an event occurs.42 In the Kassin survey, 83% of the
experts agreed, and 29% of them stated that understanding
the forgetting curve was a matter of common sense.43 In contrast, only 31% of the judges agreed that it was generally
true, and 18% stated that the average juror would agree.
Moreover, 44% of the judges answered that they “don’t
know” the answer to this eyewitness statement. In sum,
there was a considerable difference between the percentage
of judges and experts who agreed with this statement. This
implies that a large number of the judges are unaware that an
eyewitness’s memory for the details of a crime decreases
rapidly shortly after the crime occurred. Similar percentages
of judges and experts believed that understanding the forgetting curve is not a matter of common sense.
In sum, for eyewitness statements 7-11, the responses

USE OF LEGAL SAFEGUARDS

39. See e.g., Brian L. Cutler & Steven D. Penrod, Improving the
Reliability of Eyewitness Identification: Lineup Construction and
Presentation, 73 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 281-90 (1988); Lindsay &
Wells, supra note 38; Nancy M. Steblay et al., Eyewitness Accuracy
Rates in Sequential and Simultaneous Lineup Presentations: A MetaAnalytic Comparison, 25 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 459-73 (2001).
40. Kassin, supra note 2. Kassin’s eyewitness statement on lineup format stated: “Witnesses are more likely to misidentify someone by
making a relative judgment when presented with a simultaneous
(as opposed to sequential) lineup.” Furthermore, Kassin’s survey
of eyewitness experts was conducted prior to the publication of
Steblay’s meta-analytic review (see Steblay, supra note 39) that
showed that sequential lineups significantly lower the risk of false
identifications compared to simultaneous lineups without reducing the number of accurate identifications. If this review had
been published prior to the eyewitness experts completing
Kassin’s survey, undoubtedly a higher percentage of them would
have agreed that sequential lineups reduce the number of false

identifications compared to simultaneous lineups.
41. See Veronica Stinson et al., How Effective Is the Motion-to-Suppress
Safeguard? Judges’ Perceptions of the Suggestiveness and Fairness of
Biased Lineup Instructions, 82 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 211-20 (1997).
42. Kenneth A. Deffenbacher, A Maturing of Research on the Behavior
of Eyewitnesses, 5 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 377-402 (1991).
43. Kassin, supra note 2.
44. Brian L. Cutler et al., Juror Sensitivity to Eyewitness Identification
Evidence, 14 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 185-91 (1990); Penrod &
Cutler, supra note 18. Several studies have shown that jury
instructions are ineffective in educating jurors about the effects of
eyewitness factors on identification accuracy. See Edith Greene,
Judge’s Instructions on Eyewitness Testimony: Evaluation and
Revision, 18 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 252 (1988); Garbriella Ramierez,
Dennis Zemba, and R. Edward Geiselman, Judges’ Cautionary
Instructions on Eyewitness Testimony, 14 AM. J. FORENSIC PSYCHOL.
31 (1996).

For eyewitness statements 7 through 11, the judges were
also asked which, if any, of five legal safeguards (i.e., voir dire,
cross-examination, expert witness, closing argument, and jury
instruction) they would permit an attorney to use to inform a
jury about the effect of the eyewitness statement on identification accuracy. They could choose as many or as few of the five
legal safeguards as they believed were necessary. They could
also respond that they would not permit any of these safeguards or that they did not know what safeguard they would
permit. As shown in Table 4, the percentage of judges who
would permit a particular safeguard, averaged across the five
eyewitness statements, was 53% for voir dire questions, 80%
for cross-examination questions, 44% for expert witness, 74%
for closing arguments, and 24% for jury instructions. Of the
judges, 35% would not permit expert testimony for any of the
five eyewitness statements, even though expert testimony is the
only safeguard that has been shown to be effective in increasing jurors’ sensitivity to eyewitness factors.44
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GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY

13. Jurors know how most eyewitness factors affect identification accuracy. Researchers have used questionnaires,
prediction studies, and simulated trials to determine how
knowledgeable jurors are about eyewitness testimony. All
three methods have shown that jurors have limited knowledge of eyewitness factors.46 In the survey, 64% of the
judges correctly disagreed that jurors know how most eyewitness factors affect identification accuracy. Accordingly, a
majority of judges in the survey realize that knowledge of
how eyewitness factors affect identification accuracy is not
just a matter of common sense.

Eyewitness statements 1 through 11 tested the judges’
knowledge of specific eyewitness factors, such as whether a hat
makes it significantly more difficult for an eyewitness to identify the perpetrator of the crime. Eyewitness statements 12
through 16 are grouped together because they all concern more
general principles of eyewitness testimony.
12. Attorneys know how most eyewitness factors affect
identification accuracy. Several studies show that attorneys have limited knowledge of eyewitness factors.45 Only
41% of the judges correctly disagreed with the statement
that attorneys know how most eyewitness factors affect
identification accuracy.

TABLE 4
PERCENTAGES OF JUDGES WHO WOULD PERMIT A
PARTICULAR LEGAL SAFEGUARD TO BE USED FOR EYEWITNESS STATEMENTS 7-11.

Eyewitness
Factor

Voir
dire

Cross

Expert

Close

Jury
instru.

No
action

Don’t
know

7. Confidence
malleability
8. Weapon focus
9. Mug-shot-induced bias
10. Lineup format
11. Forgetting curve

58%

86%

45%

79%

27%

1%

6%

66%
60%
35%
46%

91%
87%
62%
72%

51%
43%
37%
44%

86%
80%
56%
70%

34%
29%
14%
17%

0%
1%
7%
6%

2%
6%
22%
13%

Average

53%

80%

44%

74%

24%

3%

10%

Note: Voir dire=voir dire questions, cross=cross-examination, expert=expert witness, close=closing argument, and jury instru.= jury instruction

TABLE 5
DISTRIBUTION OF JUDGES’ RESPONSES TO EYEWITNESS STATEMENTS 12-15

Topic

Strongly agree

12. Attorney’s knowledge
13. Jurors’ knowledge
14. Jurors distinguish eyewitnesses
15. Convictions solely from eyewitnesses

Agree

3%
1%
1%
5%

29%
9%
28%
18%

Neither
28%
26%
33%
29%

Disagree

Strongly disagree

40%*
51%*
31%*
36%

1%*
13%*
8%*
12%

Note: The asterisks indicate the correct answers to the eyewitness statements. There is no correct answer for eyewitness statement 15.

45. See generally John C. Brigham & Melissa P. Wolfskeil, Opinions of
Attorneys and Law Enforcement Personnel on the Accuracy of
Eyewitness Identifications, LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 337-49 (1983);
George L. Rahaim & Stanley L. Brodsky, Empirical Evidence Versus
Common Sense: Juror and Lawyer Knowledge of Eyewitness
Accuracy, 12 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 1-15 (1982); Stinson, supra note
41; A. Daniel Yarmey & Hazel P. Jones, Is the Psychology of
Eyewitness Identification a Matter of Common Sense?, in
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EVALUATING WITNESS EVIDENCE 13-40 (Sally M. A. Lloyd-Bostock
& Brian R. Clifford eds., 1983).
46. See John C. Brigham & Robert K. Bothwell, The Ability of
Prospective Jurors to Estimate the Accuracy of Eyewitness
Identifications, 7 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 19-30 (1983); Saul M. Kassin
& Kimberly A. Barndollar, The Psychology of Eyewitness
Testimony: A Comparison of Experts and Prospective Jurors, 22 J.
APPLIED PSYCHOL. 1241-49 (1992); Lindsay (1981), supra note 17.

14. Jurors can distinguish between accurate and inaccurate
eyewitnesses. In several studies, researchers have staged
crimes and then had witnesses testify about the events in
mock trials. Some witnesses were accurate and some were
inaccurate, but mock jurors were generally unable to distinguish between the testimony of accurate versus inaccurate witnesses.47 The results indicated that 29% of the
judges agreed with this statement, 33% neither agreed nor
disagreed, and 39% correctly disagreed with this statement.
Accordingly, for this critical eyewitness statement, most
judges were unaware of jurors’ inability to distinguish
accurate and inaccurate eyewitnesses.
15. Only in exceptional circumstances should a defendant
be convicted of a crime solely on the basis of eyewitness
testimony. Only 23% of the judges agreed with this summary statement, even though the unreliability of some eyewitness testimony, and jurors’ inability to distinguish accurate from inaccurate witnesses, suggests that this statement
may be true.
16. Out of 100 cases of wrongful felony convictions, how
many do you think on average would be due at least in
part to eyewitness error? A conservative estimate is that
eyewitness error occurs in at least half of all wrongful
felony convictions.48 Thirty-one judges (19%) did not
respond to this question, which suggests that many judges
were unsure how often erroneous eyewitness identifications play a role in wrongful convictions. Of the 129 judges
who responded to this eyewitness statement, the mean estimate was 37.86 cases. Only 43% of the respondents estimated that eyewitness error plays a role in at least half of
all wrongful convictions.
EDUCATION ABOUT EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY

Eyewitness statements 17 and 18 ascertained what types of
eyewitness educational materials the judges have been exposed
to, and whether they believe that judges should receive more
eyewitness training. The bolded statements for 17 and 18 are
not the exact statements in the survey.
17. The judges’ exposure to educational eyewitness materials. Of the judges, 71% reported that they had read a law
review or psychological article about eyewitness testimony,
26% had read a book on eyewitness testimony, and 69%
had attended a lecture or seminar on eyewitness testimony.
Only 14% of the judges reported that they had not been
exposed to any type of educational materials on eyewitness
testimony.
18. Whether judges should receive more training about eyewitness testimony. In the survey, 75% responded that
judges should receive more training on eyewitness testi-

47. Lindsay (1989), supra note 17; Lindsay (1981), supra note 17;
Wells (1979), supra note 17.
48. BORCHARD, supra note 8; Huff, supra note 4; Rattner, supra note
10; SCHECK, supra note 11.

mony, 10% responded
that judges receive adequate training, and 15%
did not know if judges
should receive more
training.

[J]udges in the
survey appear to
have a limited
understanding of
eyewitness factors,
CORRELATES OF JUDGES’
as they averaged
KNOWLEDGE OF
only about 55%
EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY
correct on the 14Empirical research clearly
item knowledge
identifies a correct answer for
eyewitness statements 1
scale.

through 14, and on average
for the 14 statements, judges
answered correctly 55% of the time (i.e., averaged 7.66 correct
answers). We computed correlations to ascertain whether
knowledge of eyewitness factors was related to other beliefs
about eyewitness testimony.49 Judges who were most knowledgeable, based on the number of correct answers to these 14
statements, also tended to be more critical of the value of eyewitness testimony. More knowledgeable judges were: (a) more
likely to know that eyewitness error plays an important role in
wrongful convictions (statement 16); (b) more likely to agree
that only in exceptional circumstances should a defendant be
convicted solely on the basis of eyewitness testimony (statement 15); (c) more likely to believe that jurors have limited
knowledge of eyewitness factors (judgments about jurors in
statements 7 to 11); (d) more likely to permit the use of legal
safeguards, including expert testimony to educate jurors about
eyewitness factors (judgments about safeguards in statements 7
to 11); and (e) more likely to agree that judges need more training on eyewitness factors (statement 18). Thus, greater knowledge of eyewitness factors was associated with a variety of
beliefs and behaviors that may be necessary for judges to
reduce the number of wrongful convictions.
The judges in the survey on average had practiced law for 14
years, had been on the bench for 12 years, and 76% of them had
been a prosecutor, defense attorney, or both prior to becoming
a judge. There was no significant relationship between knowledge of eyewitness factors and either legal experience, prior
criminal law experience, judicial experience, or judicial position. Thus, even extensive legal and judicial experience does
not ensure that judges know how eyewitness factors and investigative procedures affect the accuracy of eyewitness testimony.
In summary, judges in the survey appear to have a limited
understanding of eyewitness factors, as they averaged only
about 55% correct on the 14-item knowledge scale. The judges
also showed little consensus on several important issues, such
as whether at trial, eyewitness confidence is a good indicator of
eyewitness accuracy, and if jurors can distinguish accurate from
inaccurate eyewitnesses. Many judges appeared to be unfamiliar with simultaneous lineups, with the forgetting curve, and

49. Richard A. Wise & Martin A. Safer (in press), What U.S. Judges
Know and Believe About Eyewitness Testimony, 18 APPLIED
COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. (2004).
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Increasing
judges’ knowledge
of eyewitness
testimony may
be an important
step in reducing
wrongful
convictions.

with studies indicating that
half or more of all wrongful
felony convictions are due at
least in part to eyewitness
error. However, most judges
were aware of how attitudes
and expectations, administrator-blind lineups, post-event
information, weapon focus,
mug-shot-induced bias, and
confidence malleability affect
identification accuracy.

JUDGES’ BELIEFS ABOUT JURORS’ KNOWLEDGE OF
EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY

The most frequent reason judges give for not permitting an
eyewitness expert to testify during a trial is their belief that the
subject matter of the expert’s testimony is already within the
knowledge of the jurors.50 For each of the five eyewitness statements (7-11) where judges were asked if jurors know the correct answer to the statement, a majority of the judges
responded that jurors did not know the answer. For each of the
five statements, judges were much more likely to know the correct answer themselves than to believe that jurors know the
correct answer. On statement 13, 64% of the judges disagreed
with the statement that jurors know how most eyewitness factors affect identification accuracy. Thus, contrary to what published judicial opinions sometimes suggest, judges appear to
believe that jurors have a limited understanding of eyewitness
factors. On the other hand, the judges’ beliefs about jurors’
knowledge of eyewitness testimony may simply reflect their
own difficulty in responding to the questionnaire.

respondents to the questionnaire were state trial judges. Only
7% of the judges who completed the survey were federal
judges, and only 4% were appellate judges. We suspect that
judges who voluntarily participated in the survey were more
interested in and perhaps more knowledgeable about eyewitness testimony than judges in general.
Another limitation is that we asked judges about only a
small subset of factors affecting identification accuracy, and so
their knowledge scores may not represent their true knowledge
about eyewitness testimony. However, we asked mainly about
issues that have strong empirical support and that frequently
arise in many criminal trials involving eyewitness testimony.51
We avoided issues where there is less empirical support and
consensus among experts, such as the effects of stress on memory, and more esoteric issues, such as the nature of repressed
memories.
CONCLUSIONS

Although there are several potential limitations to the study,
we believe our results are still valid and informative. Some
incorrect judgments about statements 1 through 14 may represent misinterpretations of the statements, rather than lack of
knowledge. For example, some judges may have interpreted
statement 11 as forgetting the event itself, as opposed to the
details of the event. Another limitation may be that the primary

Increasing judges’ knowledge of eyewitness testimony may
be an important step in reducing wrongful convictions. More
knowledgeable judges were more aware of the dangers of convicting defendants solely on the basis of eyewitness testimony;
more willing to permit legal safeguards, including expert testimony; and more aware that jurors have limited knowledge of
eyewitness factors. Increasing judges’ knowledge of eyewitness
testimony is also important because expert testimony is not a
panacea for erroneous eyewitness testimony. Expert testimony
is effective in only some circumstances.52 It is also expensive
and time-consuming, and there are a limited number of
experts.53 Accordingly, the long-term solution to erroneous eyewitness identifications may lie in educating judges and the
other participants in the criminal justice system (e.g., police,
lawyers, and jurors) about eyewitness factors and procedures to
minimize eyewitness error, so that expert testimony would be
less necessary in criminal cases. It may also be possible for
judges who are knowledgeable about eyewitness testimony in
some criminal cases to draft jury instructions and conduct trials in such a manner that expert testimony would not be
needed.
The present study suggests that current judicial educational
materials on eyewitness materials have limited effectiveness.
This may occur because judges’ exposure to eyewitness materials may be too brief, infrequent, and superficial to be of benefit. Fisher discusses very similar problems in training police
officers to use more effective interviewing techniques with eyewitnesses.54
Perhaps another reason for the limited effectiveness of judicial education is that the primary focus of the legal system is to
detect witnesses who are lying and not witnesses who make
erroneous identifications. Thus, the legal system requires witnesses to take an oath to tell the truth and makes perjury a
crime. On the other hand, witnesses are not required to swear
that they will use reasonable care when making an identifica-

50. See United States v. Hall, 165 F.3d 1095, 1104-05 (7th Cir. 1999).
51. See Kassin, supra note 2.
52. See Cutler, supra note 44; CUTLER & PENROD, supra note 23.

53. Wells, supra note 29.
54. See generally, Ronald P. Fisher, Interviewing Victims and Witnesses
of Crime, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 732-64 (1995).

EDUCATION ABOUT EYEWITNESS FACTORS

Judges’ self-reported exposure to educational materials on
eyewitness testimony (e.g., reading a book) was only marginally related to knowledge of eyewitness factors. This result suggests that current educational materials may have limited effectiveness in teaching judges about eyewitness factors.
Furthermore, 75% of the judges agreed that judges should
receive more training on eyewitness testimony, and only 10%
stated that judges receive adequate training on eyewitness testimony. Thus, most judges in the survey recognized a need for
more judicial training on eyewitness testimony.
LIMITATIONS
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tion, and there is no sanction for an erroneous identification
even if it is made recklessly. In sum, until judges realize that
erroneous eyewitness identifications pose a grave threat to the
validity of criminal verdicts, judicial education programs on
eyewitness testimony are likely to continue to have limited
effectiveness. Indeed, an analysis of the first 62 cases involving
post-conviction DNA exoneration found that mistaken identification occurred in 52 cases, whereas false witness testimony
occurred in just 15 cases.55
Although it is unrealistic to expect judges to become eyewitness experts, they need at least to understand the basic
principles of eyewitness testimony if they are to reduce the
number of erroneous eyewitness identifications. We make a
few suggestions about what judges need to know about eyewitness testimony, and recommend that Brigham,56 Technical
Working Group for Eyewitness Evidence,57 and Wells58 be consulted for a more detailed discussion.
1. Although human memory can be reasonably accurate, it
does not operate like a passive security camera. Memory of
a crime is not preserved like a videotape with near-perfect
fidelity, and it cannot simply be rewound and replayed to
extract additional, accurate information. Some information
may never be recorded, and forgetting of details can occur
rapidly (statements 1, 2, 8, and 11). Moreover, recall of a
crime is a partially reconstructive process, with witnesses
filling in the “blanks” of what they perceived by adding
information based on both their expectancies and information obtained after the crime (see statements 3 and 5). As
Wells states: “The important point is that witnesses will
extract and incorporate new information after the witnessed event and then testify about that information as
though they actually witnessed it.”59 Thus, many factors
can affect how accurately a witness remembers a crime,
whom the witness identifies as the perpetrator of the crime,
and the witness’s level of confidence at trial. Accordingly,
the finder of fact should always carefully analyze both the
witnessing conditions and the investigative procedures that
may have affected the witness’s testimony, rather than
assuming that a witness’s testimony is accurate simply
because the witness is testifying in good faith and with a
high degree of confidence (statements 4, 6, 7, 9, and 10).
2. Eyewitness error is the primary cause of wrongful convictions not because it is inherently unreliable, but rather
because the criminal justice system has not yet implemented many procedural safeguards that could significantly reduce the number of erroneous eyewitness identifications.60 For example, a few procedural changes in how
lineups are conducted, such as the use of administratorblind lineups and sequential rather than simultaneous lineups (see statements 4 and 10), could greatly reduce the
number of erroneous eyewitness identifications without

affecting the number of
Knowledge
accurate identifications.61
of eyewitness
Judges should require that
police and prosecutors
testimony is not
implement such procejust a matter of
dures in criminal cases
common sense.
and realize that the failure
to use them significantly
Therefore, judges
increases the risk of erroneed to be more
neous eyewitness identificautious in
cations. In addition, they
excluding the
should consider suppressing evidence obtained
testimony of
from biased procedures.
eyewitness
3. Knowledge of eyewitness
experts . . . .
testimony is not just a
matter of common sense.
Therefore, judges need to be more cautious in excluding
the testimony of eyewitness experts because of their belief
that jurors already know how an eyewitness factor or procedure affects identification accuracy. Moreover, extensive
legal and judicial experience is not sufficient to ensure that
participants in the criminal justice system know how eyewitness factors and procedures affect identification accuracy. Accordingly, not only jurors but also the other participants in the criminal justice system have limited knowledge of eyewitness factors and procedures. This finding
means that jurors, law officers, and attorneys, as well as
judges, need to be better educated about eyewitness factors
and the impact of investigative procedures on eyewitness
identifications.
4. The only legal safeguard that has been empirically shown to
be effective in educating jurors about eyewitness testimony
is expert testimony. Other legal safeguards, such as voir dire
questions, cross-examination, etc., may be useful adjuncts
to expert testimony. Empirical research indicates that jurors
cannot distinguish accurate from inaccurate eyewitnesses.
Although eyewitness experts cannot tell jurors if an eyewitness has made an accurate identification, they can educate jurors about eyewitness factors and procedures. With
this information, jurors can better evaluate the likelihood
that an eyewitness has made an accurate identification of
the perpetrator of a crime.
5. A greater dialogue between judges and eyewitness
researchers about eyewitness testimony would be very useful in reducing eyewitness error because both groups could
benefit from the others’ experiences and expertise. A collaboration between judges and eyewitness experts is also
important because, as Wells points out, the “scientific study
of eyewitness memory is a continuing process.”62
Accordingly, it is important that judges stay abreast of the

55. SCHECK, supra note 11.
56. Brigham, supra note 2.
57. TECHNICAL WORKING GROUP FOR EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE, EYEWITNESS
EVIDENCE: A GUIDE FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT (1999).
58. Wells, supra note 12.
59. Id. at 583.

60. See generally id.
61. See Dep’t Justice’s Recommendations for the Collection and
Preservation of Eyewitness Evidence, TECHNICAL WORKING GROUP
FOR EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE, supra note 57.
62. Wells, supra note 12, at 590.
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latest scientific research on eyewitness testimony and that
researchers receive feedback from judges on how best to
implement their findings into the criminal justice system.
Moreover, because scientific knowledge is constantly evolving as a result of new research and new methods, our
knowledge of how eyewitness factors and procedures affect
eyewitness accuracy will never be complete. There will
always be some experts who disagree with the majority of
experts on how eyewitness factors and procedures affect
accuracy.63 Incomplete knowledge, controversies, and disagreements are inherent in the nature of scientific research.
Consequently, if judges exclude the testimony of eyewitness
experts merely because scientific knowledge on a topic is
incomplete or because there is some disagreement among
experts, then judges will be excluding eyewitness experts
because of a misconception about the nature of scientific
research. They will also be depriving fact finders of an
essential tool for minimizing eyewitness error.
Judges are the guardians of the judicial system, and with
increased knowledge about eyewitness testimony, they may
be able to meaningfully address the problem of wrongful
convictions. Reducing wrongful convictions is essential
because the continual discovery of wrongful convictions
undermines the credibility of the legal system. Reducing
wrongful convictions is also vital because they cause incalculable suffering both to the innocent persons who are
wrongfully convicted and to the victims of crimes that are
committed because the real perpetrator of a crime has not
been brought to justice.

63. Howard Egeth, Expert Psychological Testimony about Eyewitnesses:
An Update, in PSYCHOLOGY, SCIENCE, AND HUMAN AFFAIRS: ESSAYS IN
HONOR OF WILLIAM BEVAN 151-66 (Frank Kessel ed., 1995);
Rogers Elliott, Expert Testimony about Eyewitness Identification: A
Critique, 17 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 423-37 (1993).
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Recent Civil Decisions of the
United States Supreme Court:
The 2002-2003 Term
Charles H. Whitebread

T

he past term of the United States Supreme Court was dramatic, unexpected, and produced constitutional decisions
that affect the nature and fabric of our society. The term
had three or four “star” cases: the approval of affirmative
action, the striking down of bans on gay sexual relations, the
U-turn in the Court’s federalism revolution, and the restriction
on punitive damage awards. These decisions and the other rulings in constitutional law outside the criminal field made up
the bulk of the Court’s opinions for the 2002-2003 term.1
FIRST AMENDMENT: INTENTIONAL
MISREPRESENTATIONS IN CHARITABLE SOLICITATIONS

In Illinois v. Telemarketing Associates, Inc.,2 a unanimous
Court held that the First Amendment leaves open fraud claims
based on nondisclosure if charitable solicitations are accompanied by misleading statements regarding what percentage of
donations fundraisers will retain for themselves. The Illinois
Attorney General filed a complaint against a solicitor raising
funds for a charitable organization, alleging common-law and
statutory claims for fraud and breach of fiduciary duty on the
grounds that the solicitor misrepresented to donors that a large
part of their donations would be given to the charity, when in
fact only 15%-20% actually were. The charitable solicitor
moved to dismiss the fraud claims, “urging that they were
barred by the First Amendment.” Based on precedent, specifically Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment,3 Secretary
of State of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson Co.,4 and Riley v. National
Federation of Blind of N.C., Inc.,5 the Court recognized that “had
the complaint against Telemarketers charged fraud based solely
on the percentage of donations the fundraisers would retain, or
their failure to alert potential donors to their fee arrangements,” it would dismiss the case. However, the complaint
made different allegations, ones that “target misleading affirmative misrepresentations about how donations will be used.”
The Court concluded that First Amendment precedent did not
protect these misrepresentations.
FIRST AMENDMENT: SYMBOLIC CONDUCT

In Virginia v. Black,6 the Court determined that a Virginia
statute banning cross burning with the intent to intimidate violated the First Amendment because it treated the act of the

Footnotes
1. For a more in-depth review of the decisions of the past term, see
CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD, RECENT DECISIONS OF THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT, 2002-2003 (Amer. Acad. of Jud. Educ. 2003).
2. 123 S. Ct. 1829 (2003).
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cross burning as prima facie evidence of intent. The statute
provides that “[i]t shall be unlawful for any person or persons,
with the intent of intimidating any person or group of persons,
to burn, or cause to be burned, a cross on the property of
another, a highway or other public place.” It further states,
“Any such burning of a cross shall be prima facie evidence of
an intent to intimidate a person or group of persons.”
Respondents were separately convicted under this statute. The
majority of the Court determined that cross burnings fall into a
category of proscribed speech. In making this determination,
the Court noted that states may “ban a ‘true threat[:]’ . . . statements where the speaker means to communicate a serious
expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence
to a particular individual or group of individuals.” The speaker
need not intend to carry out the threat, rather “the prohibition
. . . protects individuals from the fear of violence and from the
disruption that fear engenders, in addition to protecting people
from the possibility that the threatened violence will occur.”
The majority concluded that the Virginia statute “does not run
afoul of the First Amendment insofar as it bans cross burning
with intent to intimidate.” Yet, the Court still determined the
statute to be unconstitutional.
Justice O’Connor, writing for a plurality, said, “The prima
facie evidence provision, as interpreted by the jury instruction,
renders the statute unconstitutional.” Because the “jury
instruction is the Model Jury instruction, and because the
Supreme Court of Virginia had the opportunity to expressly
disavow the jury instruction, the jury instruction’s construction
of the prima facie provisions ‘is a ruling on a question of state
law that is binding on us as though the precise words had been
written into’ the statute.” Justice Scalia concluded that the
Court “should vacate and remand the judgment to the Virginia
Supreme Court so that the court can have an opportunity
authoritatively to construe the prima-facie-evidence provision.” Justice Souter, also concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part, said that no “exception should save Virginia’s
law from unconstitutionality under the holding in R.A.V. v. St.
Paul,7 or any acceptable variation of it.” The statute discriminates against expression based on content, he said, and the
prima facie evidence provision merely “skews the statute
toward suppressing ideas.” Justice Thomas dissented, arguing

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

444 U.S. 620 (1980).
467 U.S. 947 (1984).
487 U.S. 781 (1988).
123 S. Ct. 1536 (2003).
505 U.S. 377 (1992).

that “this statute prohibits only conduct, not expressions” and
“the fact that the statute permits a jury to draw an inference of
intent to intimidate from the cross burning itself presents no
constitutional problem.” In his view, an inference “does not
compel a specific conclusion,” and there is no “procedural
consequence of shifting the burden of production.” It neither
chills speech nor violates “due process.”
FIRST AMENDMENT: CORPORATE CONTRIBUTIONS TO
POLITICAL CANDIDATES

tions exhibit.” Similarly, in
Austin v. Michigan Chamber
of Commerce,12 the Court
“sustained Michigan’s ban
on direct corporate contribution, even though the
ban ‘included within its
scope closely held corporations that do not possess
vast reservoirs of capital.’”

[T]he Court
determined that
a Virginia statute
banning cross
burning with the
intent to intimidate
violated the First
Amendment . . . .

Federal law “makes it ‘unlawful . . . for any corporation
whatever . . . to make a contribution or expenditure in connection with’ certain federal elections.”8 The statute does
allow the creation of political action committees (PACs), however, for the “administration, and solicitation of contributions.” In Federal Election Comm’n v. Beaumont,9 the Court,
with Justice Souter writing for the majority, held the ban on
direct corporate contributions under 2 U.S.C. § 441b, even as
applied to nonprofit advocacy corporations, does not violate
the First Amendment.
The Court begins with the history of and purposes behind
the corporate contribution laws, stating, “Any attack on the
federal prohibition of direct corporate political contributions
goes against the current of a century of congressional efforts to
curb corporations’ potentially ‘deleterious influences on federal elections.’” Citing to Federal Elections Comm’n v. National
Right to Work Comm’n.,10 the Court said that prior decision “all
but decided the issue against” the nonprofit group’s position.
National Right to Work involved “the provision of § 441b
restricting a nonstock corporation to its membership when
soliciting contributions to its PAC.” In National Right to Work,
the Court “considered whether a nonprofit advocacy corporation without members of the usual sort could be held to violate the law by soliciting donations to its PAC from any individual who had at one time contributed to the corporation.”
The Court held that solicitation beyond “members” violated
section 441b and that the prohibition was not invalid under
the First Amendment. The Court concluded that “the congressional judgment to regulate corporate political involvement ‘warrants considerable deference’ and ‘reflects a permissible assessment of the dangers posed by [corporations] to the
electoral process.’”
The Court noted that “later cases have repeatedly acknowledged, without questioning, the reading of National Right to
Work as generally approving the § 441b prohibition on direct
contributions, even by nonprofit corporations ‘without great
financial reserves.’” In Federal Election Comm’n v. National
Conservative Political Action Committee,11 the Court reaffirmed
“that Congress might include, along with labor unions and
corporations traditionally prohibited from making contributions to political candidates, membership corporations, though
contributions by the latter might not exhibit all of the evil that
contributions by traditional economically organized corpora-

In Virginia v. Hicks,13 a unanimous Court found Virginia’s
Richmond Redevelopment and Housing Authority’s (RRHA)
trespassing policy, which resulted in a conviction for trespass
of Kevin Hicks, was not facially invalid under the First
Amendment’s overbreadth doctrine. The RRHA owns and
operates a housing development for low-income residents
called Whitcomb Court. The streets were closed to public use.
The RRHA also enacted a policy authorizing Richmond police,
to serve notice, either orally or in writing, to any person who
is found on the RRHA’s property when “such person is not a
resident, employee, or such person cannot demonstrate a legitimate business or social purpose for being on the premises.
Such notice shall forbid the person from returning to the property.” After notification, a person could be arrested.
The Court noted that under Members of City Council of Los
Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent14 and Broadrick v. Oklahoma,15
the overbreadth doctrine is an exception to the normal rule
regarding the standards for facial challenges, and that a showing that a law punishes a “substantial” amount of protected
free speech, “judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep . . . suffices to invalidate all enforcement of that
law, ‘until and unless a limiting construction or partial invalidation so narrows it as to remove the seeming threat or deterrence to constitutionally protected expression.’”
The Court asserted that Hicks had not made a showing that
the RRHA policy as a whole was unconstitutional, even assuming the unlawfulness of the policy’s “unwritten” rule that
demonstrating and leafleting at Whitecomb Court requires permission. As for the written provision authorizing the police to
arrest those who return to Whitcomb Court after receiving a
barment notice, the Court concluded that this provision “certainly” does not violate the First Amendment as applied to persons whose post-notice entry is not for the purpose of engaging
in constitutionally protected speech. The Court said that this
policy had nothing to do with the First Amendment, and was
sufficiently similar to a person being lawfully banned from a
public park for vandalizing it and then reentering the park to
participate in a political demonstration. Simply, “[h]ere, as
there, it’s Hicks’ nonexpressive conduct—his entry in violation
of the notice-barment rule—not his speech, for which he is
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123 S. Ct. 2200 (2003).
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punished as a trespasser.”
Most importantly, both the
notice-barment rule and the
“legitimate business or
social purpose” rule apply
to all persons who enter the
streets of Whitcomb Court,
not just to those who seek to
engage in expression.
“Hicks has not shown,
based on the record in this
case, that the RRHA trespass
policy as a whole prohibits a ‘substantial’ amount of protected
speech in relation to its many legitimate applications,” the
Court concluded.

claim—the CTEA’s extension of existing copyrights violated
the First Amendment—the Court noted that the Copyright
Clause and First Amendment were adopted close in time and
this, according to the Court, indicates “copyright’s purpose is
to promote the creation and publication of free expression” by
“establishing a marketable right to the use of one’s expression.”
Furthermore, “copyright law contains built-in First
Amendment accommodations.” First, “it distinguishes
between ideas and expression and makes only the latter eligible for copyright protection.” Second, “the ‘fair use’ defense
allows the public to use not only facts and ideas contained in
a copyrighted work, but also expression itself in certain circumstances.”

FIRST AMENDMENT: COPYRIGHT TERM EXTENSION ACT

In United States v. American Library Association,18 the Court
found that Congress’s condition that public libraries use filters
on their computers to block internet access to obscene material and child pornography to secure federal funding, contained
in the Children’s Internet Protection Act (CIPA), does not violate the First Amendment, nor is it an invalid exercise of its
spending power. Chief Justice Rehnquist announced the judgment of the Court and wrote the plurality opinion, in which
Justices O’Connor, Scalia, and Thomas joined. Justices
Kennedy and Breyer filed concurring opinions. Justice Souter
filed a dissent, in which Justice Ginsburg joined. The plurality recognized that “Congress has wide latitude to attach conditions to the receipt of federal assistance in order to further its
policy objectives,” with the caveat, of course, that it may “not
‘induce’ the recipient ‘to engage in activities that would themselves be unconstitutional.’” In determining whether the
restriction violates the First Amendment, the Court determined that a heightened judicial standard of review was
“incompatible with the discretion that public libraries must
have to fulfill their traditional missions”—“Public library staffs
necessarily consider content in making collection decisions
and enjoy broad discretion in making them.” Furthermore, the
possibility that a filter might “overblock” does not render the
statute unconstitutional. The Court wrote, “Assuming that
such erroneous blocking presented constitutional difficulties,
any such concerns are dispelled by the ease with which patrons
may have the filtering software disabled.”
The Court next addressed the issue of whether the statute
“imposes an unconstitutional condition on the receipt of federal assistance.” It noted that “under this doctrine, ‘the government may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that
infringes his constitutionally protected . . . freedom of speech
even if he has no entitlement to that benefit.’” The Court concluded that it need not decide that issue because, “even assuming that appellees may assert an ‘unconstitutional conditions’
claim, this claim would fail on the merits.” The Court relied
on its decision in Rust v. Sullivan,19 where it upheld Congress’s
restriction on using federal funds in programs that provided

The Court
concluded that
the Copyright
Term Extension Act
complied with the
“limited times”
requirement of the
Constitution . . . .

The Copyright and Patent Clause of the Constitution,
Article I, § 8, cl. 8, provides as to copyrights: “Congress shall
have Power . . . to promote the Progress of Science . . . by
securing [to Authors] for limited Times . . . the exclusive Right
to their . . . Writings.” In Eldred v. Ashcroft,16 Justice Ginsburg,
writing for a 7-2 Court, held the Copyright Term Extension
Act’s (CTEA) extension of existing copyrights does not exceed
Congress’s power under the Copyright Clause or violate the
First Amendment. The CTEA,17 enacted by Congress in 1998,
extended the duration of copyrights by 20 years. Now, “for
works created by identified natural persons, the term now lasts
from creation until 70 years after the author’s death” and “for
anonymous works, pseudonymous works, and works made for
hire, the term is 95 years from publication or 120 years from
creation, whichever expires first.”
The Court concluded the CTEA complied with the “limited
times” requirement of the Constitution and, furthermore, was
a “rational exercise of the legislative authority conferred by the
Copyright Clause.” The Court adopted a traditional “rationality” test, rather than a three-part test that engages a heightened
scrutiny as encouraged by Justice Breyer in his dissent, because
“’it is not [the Court’s] role to alter the delicate balance
Congress has labored to achieve.’” The Court added, “The
CTEA reflects judgments of a kind Congress typically makes,
judgments [the Court] cannot dismiss as outside the
Legislature’s domain.” The passage of the CTEA, and its
extended time frame for copyright protection, clearly reflects
Congress’s intention of ensuring that “American authors
would receive the same copyright protection in Europe as their
European counterparts.”
Moving to the petitioners’ First Amendment claim, the
Court rejected petitioners’ arguments (1) that “the CTEA is a
content-neutral regulation of speech that fails heightened judicial review under the First Amendment” and (2) “for imposition of uncommonly strict scrutiny on a copyright scheme that
incorporates its own speech-protective purposes and safeguards.” Considering the narrower version of petitioners’

16. 123 S.Ct. 1505 (2003).
17. Pub. L. 105-298 § 102(b) and (d) amending 17 U.S.C. §§ 302,
304.
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FIRST AMENDMENT: CHILDREN’S INTERNET
PROTECTION ACT

18. 123 S. Ct. 1012 (2003).
19. 500 U.S. 173 (1991).

abortion counseling. The Court recognized, as here, “that ‘the
Government [was] not denying a benefit to anyone, but [was]
instead simply insisting that public funds be spent for the purposes for which they were authorized.’”
FIRST AMENDMENT: PRISONERS’ VISITATION RIGHTS

In Overton v. Bazzetta,20 Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court, which held that restrictions on prisoners’ visitation rights do not violate the First Amendment if rationally
related to a legitimate penological interest. The regulations at
issue in this case were enacted by the Michigan Department of
Corrections and severely restricted the visitation rights of prisoners in order to maintain better control during visitation periods and to prevent smuggling, drug trafficking, and other
harmful conduct, some of which was displayed before children
who were visitors to the prison facilities. The regulations were
challenged as they pertained to prisoners who were only entitled to noncontact visitations. In upholding the regulations,
the Court addressed whether these regulations infringed upon
the constitutional right of association under the First
Amendment, recognizing that the Constitution “protects ‘certain kinds of highly personal relationships.’” The Court noted,
however, “many liberties and privileges enjoyed by other citizens must be surrendered by the prisoner. An inmate does not
retain rights inconsistent with proper incarceration.” The
Court did not “attempt to explore or define” the asserted right
of association because the regulations at issue in this case “bear
a rational relation to legitimate penological interests,” which
“suffices to sustain the regulation in question.”
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: EQUAL PROTECTION
CLAUSE

In Grutter v. Bollinger,21 the Court, in a 5-4 decision,
endorsed Justice Powell’s opinion in Regents of Univ. of Cal. v.
Bakke,22 and determined that a law school admission policy
that considers race as only one of many factors in evaluating
applicants to achieve the institution’s goal of a “diverse” student body does not violate the Equal Protection Clause. In
Bakke, Justice Powell wrote that “‘the guarantee of equal protection cannot mean one thing when applied to one individual
and something else when applied to a person of another
color.’” Therefore, both must be accorded the same protection.
When a “governmental” decision touches upon an individual’s
racial or ethnic ground, “he is entitled to a judicial determination that the burden he is asked to bear on that basis is precisely tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest.”
The only interest Justice Powell accepted as valid was “the
attainment of a diverse student body,” with the proviso that
“constitutional limitations protecting individual rights may
not be disregarded.” Justice Powell was “careful to emphasize
that in his view race ‘is only one element in a range of factors
a university properly may consider in attaining the goal of a
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heterogeneous student body.”
The Court in Grutter concluded
that the law school’s admission
program was consistent with
Powell’s Bakke approach—a narrowly tailored system designed to
achieve a diverse student body.
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT:
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION

In Grutter v.
Bollinger, the
Court, in a 5-4
decision,
endorsed Justice
Powell’s opinion
in Bakke . . . .

Addressing the issue of affirmative action, the Court, in Gratz v. Bollinger,23 held an undergraduate admissions policy that assigned a certain number of
“admission” points to individuals based on race or ethnicity
was in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Justice
Rehnquist, writing for a 5-4 Court, reviewed the admission policy of University of Michigan’s College of Literature, Science,
and the Arts. Their policy automatically assigned 20 points to
an applicant in an underrepresented class. First, in light of its
opinion set forth in Grutter v. Bollinger, the Court found that
“diversity” is a valid compelling state interest. However, the
Court determined that the University’s policies were not “narrowly tailored to achieve such an interest.” The Court cited
Justice Powell’s opinion in Bakke for the proposition that such
programs “‘preferring members of any one group for no reason
other than race or ethnic origins is discrimination for its own
sake.’” While “race or ethnic background may be deemed a
plus in a particular applicant’s file,” a policy must be “‘flexible
enough to consider all pertinent elements of diversity in light of
the particular qualifications of each applicant.’” The Court
found that the university’s current policy “does not provide
such individualized consideration.”
DUE PROCESS CLAUSE: SAME-SEX RELATIONSHIP

In a landmark decision, the Court in Lawrence v. Texas24
held a Texas statute criminalizing certain private, consensual
sexual acts between individuals of the same sex violates their
liberty rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Justice Kennedy wrote the opinion for the court
and Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined.
Justice O’Connor filed an opinion concurring in the judgment.
Justice Scalia, Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justice Thomas dissented. In its decision, the Court began by recognizing “there
are broad statements of the substantive reach of liberty under
the Due Process Clause in earlier cases.” Following its line of
decisions from Griswold v. Connecticut,25 to Bowers v.
Hardwick,26 the Court said that “our laws and traditions in the
past half century are of most relevance here. These references
show an emerging awareness that liberty gives substantial protection to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to sex.” The Court said “the
emerging recognition should have been apparent when Bowers

24. 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003).
25. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
26. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
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was decided.” While “stare
decisis is essential to the
respect accorded to the
judgments of the Court and
to the stability of the law,” it
is not an inexorable command. The Court concluded, “Bowers was not
correct when it was
decided, and it is not correct today. It ought not to remain binding precedent.” The
Court overruled Bowers and invalidated the Texas statute.

The Court
concluded,
“Bowers was not
correct when it was
decided, and it is
not correct today.”

FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: EQUAL PROTECTION AND
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS

In City of Cuyahoga Falls v. Buckeye Community Hope
Foundation,27 Justice O’Connor wrote the opinion for the
unanimous court. In this decision, the Court held that a nonprofit housing agency, Buckeye Community Hope Foundation,
failed to state a claim for an equal protection or substantive
due process violation when it alleged the City of Cuyahoga
Falls and its officials violated the Equal Protection and Due
Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment “in allowing a
site plan approval ordinance to be submitted to the electors of
Cuyahoga Falls through referendum and in rejecting [its]
application for building permits.” The Cuyahoga City Charter
granted voters “the power to approve or reject at the polls any
ordinance or resolution passed by the Council within thirty
days of the ordinance’s passage.” The voters of Cuyahoga,
using this process, stalled the issuance of the building permits
and subsequently passed a referendum repealing an ordinance
allowing Buckeye to construct low-income housing. The Ohio
Supreme Court subsequently declared the referendum unconstitutional and the necessary building permits were issued to
Buckeye. However, Buckeye maintained this action in federal
court for violation of the fourteenth Amendment.
Addressing the equal protection claim first, the Court said,
“We have made clear that proof of racially discriminatory intent
or purpose is required to show a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause.” Buckeye, however, did not claim injury
from the referendum itself, but the “petitioning process.” The
Court concluded that “neither of the official acts [Buckeye]
challenge[s] reflects the intent required to support equal protection liability.” The “City acted pursuant to the requirements
of its charter, which set out a facially neutral petitioning procedure.” Likewise, the city engineer, in refusing to issue the
appropriate permits while the referendum was still pending,
“performed a nondiscretionary, ministerial act.” Buckeye did
not point to any evidence “suggesting these official acts were
themselves motivated by racial animus.” The Court also rejects
Buckeye’s reliance instead on the “allegedly discriminatory
voter sentiment” to show an equal protection violation, stating
“statements made by private individuals in the course of a citizen-driven petition drive, while sometimes relevant . . . do not,

27. 123 S.Ct. 1389 (2003).
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in and of themselves, constitute state action for the purposes of
the Fourteenth Amendment.” The Court concluded that there
was no evidence presented to show that these private motives
should be attributed to the state.
The Court also found that Buckeye failed to allege a substantive due process violation. Buckeye asserted two grounds
by which the City violated its due process rights: (1) Buckeye
had a “legitimate claim of entitlement to the building permits,
and therefore a property interest in those permits . . . [and] the
City engaged in arbitrary conduct by denying [Buckeye] the
benefit of the plan”; and (2) “submission of an administrative
land-use determination to the charter’s referendum procedures
constitutes per se arbitrary conduct.” The Court did not consider whether Buckeye had a property interest in the permits
“because the city engineer’s refusal to issue the permits while
the petition was pending in no sense constituted egregious or
arbitrary government conduct,” the type of conduct necessary
to find a substantive due process violation. Instead, the city
engineer acted according to the advice of the city attorney and
the city charter. Second, the Court rejects Buckeye’s arguments
of per se arbitrary conduct. The Court has previously refused
to make such a distinction between legislative and administrative referendums, as evidenced in Eastlake v. Forest City
Enterprises, Inc.28 In that case, the Court held that “because all
power stems from the people, ‘a referendum cannot . . . be
characterized as a delegation of power,’ unlawful unless
accompanied by ‘discernable standards.’” The people retain
the power to govern through referendum “with respect to any
matter, legislative or administrative, within the realm of local
affairs.” The Court said that “though the substantive result of
a referendum may be invalid if it is arbitrary and capricious,”
Buckeye was not challenging the referendum itself, merely the
city’s compliance.
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT:
EXCESSIVE PUNITIVE DAMAGES AWARD

Addressing excessive punitive damages award in a civil
action, the Court in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance,
Co. v. Campbell29 held a punitive damage award of $145 million, where full compensatory damages were $1 million, was
excessive and violated the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of a 6-3 Court, which relied heavily on BMW of North
America, Inc. v. Gore.30 In Gore, the Court instructed reviewing
courts to consider three guideposts: “(1) the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s misconduct; (2) the disparity
between the actual or potential harm suffered by the plaintiff
and the punitive damages award; and (3) the difference
between the punitive damages awarded by the jury and the
civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases.”
Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Ginsburg dissented on grounds
that the Due Process Clause does not constrain the size of
punitive damage awards.

29. 123 S.Ct. 1513 (2003).
30. 517 U.S. 559 (1996).

FEDERALISM: FAMILY MEDICAL LEAVE ACT OF 1993

In Nevada Dept. of Human Resources v. Hibbs,31 Justice
Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court, which held that
an individual may sue a state under the family-care provision
of the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), which provides 12
weeks of unpaid leave, as the provision is a valid exercise of
Congress’s power under section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The Court began by noting that “the
Constitution does not provide for federal jurisdiction over
suits against nonconsenting States.” However, “Congress may
. . . abrogate such immunity in federal court if it makes its
intention to abrogate unmistakably clear in the language of the
statute and acts pursuant to a valid exercise of its power under
§ 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.” The Court held that here
FMLA clearly “enables employees to seek damages ‘against any
employer (including a public agency) in any Federal or State
court of competent jurisdiction.’”32 A “public agency,” as
defined by Congress, “include[s] both ‘the government of a
State or political subdivision thereof’ and ‘any agency of . . . a
State, or a political subdivision of a State.’”33 Furthermore, the
Court determined that FMLA’s enactment was appropriate
under section 5 because it “aims to protect the right to be free
from gender-based discrimination in the workplace.”
FEDERALISM: SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION

In Jinks v. Richland County, South Carolina,34 a unanimous
Court, in an opinion written by Justice Scalia, held that 28
U.S.C. section 1367(d), which tolls the statute of limitations
for state law claims filed in a federal court under supplemental
jurisdiction, is not unconstitutional even as applied to a state’s
political subdivisions. Petitioner filed an action in federal
court, which included supplemental state claims against the
county for wrongful death and survival. The district court dismissed these claims without prejudice, and petitioner filed a
state action within 30 days of the dismissal. The county
argued these claims were time-barred on the grounds that section 1367(d) is “facially invalid because it exceeds the enumerated powers of Congress” and, even if facially valid,
“should not be interpreted to apply to claims brought against
a State’s political subdivision” because it interferes with their
right to sovereign immunity.
The Court began by recognizing that Article I, section 8 of
the Constitution authorizes Congress “‘to make all Laws which
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution
[Congress’s Article I, § 8] Powers and all other Powers vested
by this Constitution in the Government of the United States.’”
The Court found section 1367(d) “necessary,” because it is
“‘conducive to the due administration of justice’ in a federal
court and is ‘plainly adapted’ to that end.” Furthermore, the
Court concluded that section 1367(d) was “’plainly adapted to
the power of Congress to establish the lower federal courts and
provide for the fair and efficient exercise of their Article III
powers.” Neither party suggested that section 1367(d) was a
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“pretext” for an improper
[A]n individual
objective or is so attenuated
may sue a state
with Congress’s authority
“as to undermine the enuunder the familymeration of powers set
care provision of
forth in Article I, § 8.”
the Family Medical
The Court also found
that the tolling provision set
Leave Act . . . .
out in section 1367(d) did
not constitute “an impermissible abrogation of ‘sovereign immunity.’” The Court determined that those provisions did not encroach upon a state’s
sovereign immunity as applied to its political subdivisions.
First, as recognized in Alden v. Maine,35 while “Congress lacks
authority under Article I to override a State’s sovereign immunity from suit in its own courts, it may subject a municipality
to suit in state court if that is done pursuant to a valid exercise
of its enumerated powers.” Municipalities do not enjoy the
same constitutional immunity as states.
FEDERALISM: NEGATIVE COMMERCE CLAUSE AND
PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES CLAUSE

In Hillside Dairy, Inc. v. Lyons,36 the Court, in an opinion
written by Justice Stevens, held a California state law that burdens or discriminates against out-of-state suppliers is subject
to a challenge under the negative Commerce Clause. It is subject to challenge when it is not expressly immunized to such a
challenge by federal statute, and is subject to a challenge under
the Privileges and Immunities Clause, even when it does not
on its face make a distinction against an individual based on
residency or citizenship. In most of the United States, not
including California, “the minimum price paid to dairy farmers producing raw milk is regulated pursuant to federal marketing orders.” In California, “three related statutes establish
the regulatory structure for milk produced, processed, or sold
in California.” In 1997, the California Department of Food
and Agriculture “amended its plan to require that contributions to the pool be made on some out-of-state purchases.”
Petitioners, out-of-state producers, brought an action challenging the 1997 amendment as discriminatory against them.
California argued that it was exempt from regulation based on
§ 144 of the Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act
of 1996.37 Congress passed section 144, which exempts
California only regarding the composition of milk products,
because California’s composition standards exceed some of
those set by the federal Food and Drug Administration.
The Court concluded, based on the plain language of the
statute, that section 144 “does not encompass pricing and pooling laws,” and therefore, “California’s pricing and pooling laws
[are not insulated] from a Commerce Clause challenge.”
Furthermore, the Court also determined that the individual
petitioners were not banned from raising a Privileges and
Immunities Clause challenge. Article IV, section 2 of the

35. 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
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Constitution provides: “The
citizens of each State shall be
entitled to all Privileges and
Immunities of Citizens in the
several States.” The Court
concluded that, while the
lower courts correctly banned
the corporate petitioners from
raising this argument, the
individual petitioners could
go forward with their claims.
The Court cited to its holding
in Chalker v. Birmingham &
Northwestern R. Co.,38 stating
that it could be interpreted
two ways: (1) the Clause applies “to classifications that are but
proxies for differential treatment against out-of-state residents”;
or (2) it prohibits “any classification with the practical effect of
discriminating against such residents.” The Court concluded
that, in this case, it did not matter which interpretation was correct because under either the absence of an express statement
in the California laws and regulations identifying out-of-state
citizenship as a basis for disparate treatment was not sufficient
for rejecting this claim.

Justice Stevens
concluded that the
“question is
whether there is a
probability that
Maine’s program
was preempted
by the mere
existence of the
federal statute.”

FEDERALISM: STATE MEDICAID REGULATIONS

In Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America v.
Walsh,39 the Court determined that the petitioners did not meet
their burden for a preliminary injunction by showing that the
Maine statute providing “supplemental rebate programs to
achieve additional cost savings on Medicaid purchases as well
as purchases made by other needy citizens” (the “Maine Rx
Program”) was preempted by federal law, or that it violated the
negative Commerce Clause. Justice Stevens announced the
judgment of the Court. Prior to 1990, the Medicaid statute did
not “specifically address” outpatient prescription drug coverage. In 1990, Congress created a rebate program for prescription drugs in an amendment contained in the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1990 (OBRA 1990). The plan had two
parts: (1) “It imposed a general requirement that, in order to
qualify for Medicaid payments, drug companies must enter into
agreements either with the Secretary or, if authorized by the
Secretary, with individual States, to provide rebates on their
Medicaid sales of outpatient prescription drugs,” and (2) “Once
a drug manufacturer enters into a rebate agreement, the law
requires the State to provide coverage for that drug under its
plan unless the State complies with one of the exclusion or
restriction provisions in the Medicaid Act.” The Court wrote,
“Most relevant to this case, Congress allowed States, ‘as a condition of coverage or payment for a covered outpatient drug,’ §
1396r-8(d)(5), to require approval of the drug before it is dispensed.” In the OBRA 1993, Congress further amended the Act
to allow States to use “formularies” subject to strict limitations.
Justice Stevens concluded that the “question is whether
there is a probability that Maine’s program was preempted by
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the mere existence of the federal statute.” In analyzing this
question, Justice Stevens focused on “the centerpiece of petitioner’s attack on the Maine Rx Program, [which] is its
allegedly unique use of a threat to impose a prior authorization
requirement on Medicaid sales to coerce manufacturers into
reducing their prices on sales to non-Medicaid recipients.”
However, Justice Stevens recognized that it was petitioners’
burden to show that “no Medicaid purpose” exists, and that a
preliminary injunction is improper “if the program on its face
clearly serves some Medicaid-related goal or purpose.” He
found that three such purposes existed. First, “the program
will provide medical benefits to persons who can be described
as ‘medically needy’ even if they do not qualify for AFDC or SSI
benefits.” Second, “there is a possibility that, by enabling some
borderline aged and infirm persons better access to prescription drugs earlier, Medicaid expenses will be reduced.” And
third, patients will be protected from “inappropriate” prescriptions, and the use of cost-effective medications will be encouraged. While these reasons ultimately might not be enough to
save the statute from preemption, it was “incorrect for the
District Court to assume that any impediment, ‘no matter how
modest,’ to a patient’s ability to obtain the drug of her choice
at the State’s expense would invalidate the Maine Rx Program.”
The Court said that petitioner’s “Commerce Clause challenge focuses on the effects of the rebate agreements that will
follow manufacturer compliance with the program.” The
Court concluded that Maine’s Rx Program “does not regulate
the price of any out-of-state transaction, either by its express
terms or by its inevitable effect.” First, “Maine does not insist
that manufacturers sell their drugs to a wholesaler for a certain
price.” Second, “Maine is not tying the price of its in-state
products to out-of-state products.”
FEDERALISM:
PREEMPTION BY FEDERAL FOREIGN POLICY

In American Insurance Association v. Garamendi,40 Justice
Souter delivered the opinion of the Court, holding California’s
Holocaust Victim Insurance Relief Act of 1999 (HVIRA), which
requires an insurer doing business in the state to disclose information about policies sold by it or its affiliates in Europe
between 1920 and 1945, was preempted under the foreign
affairs doctrine of federal executive authority to set foreign relations. The Court began by recognizing that the President has
independent authority under the Constitution to decide foreign
policies and that “an exercise of state power that touches on foreign relations must yield to the National Government’s policy.”
The President can execute executive agreements with foreign
countries, requiring no ratification by the Senate or approval by
Congress; this power includes “the settlement of claims.”
In July 2000, the President and German Chancellor
Schroder signed an executive agreement, called the German
Foundation Agreement, to reach a remedy regarding the
numerous unsettled claims individuals had against German
companies that stemmed from the Nazi era in Germany. In
terms of insurance policies, both countries agreed that the

40. 123 S.Ct. 2374 (2003).

German Holocaust Foundation would work with the
International Commission on Holocaust Era Insurance Claims
(ICHEIC), a voluntary organization formed in 1998, whose primary purpose is to negotiate with European insurers “to provide
information about unpaid insurance policies issued to
Holocaust victims and settlement of claims brought under
them.”
The German Foundation Agreement does not expressly state
that it preempts laws like HVIRA, leaving the government only
with the argument that preemption rests because of “interference with foreign policy those agreements embody.” Turning to
its decision in Zschering v. Miller,41 in which the majority reasoned “state action with more than incidental effect on foreign
affairs is preempted, even absent any affirmative federal activity in the subject area of the state law, and hence without any
showing of conflict,” the Court concluded that HVIRA is sufficiently in conflict with foreign policy as to require preemption.
First, the Court concluded that resolving Holocaust-era
insurance claims “is a matter well within the Executive’s
responsibility for foreign affairs.” Second, in this instance, the
government has a foreign policy regarding the law addressed by
HVIRA: “the three settlement agreements are enough to illustrate that the consistent Presidential foreign policy has been to
encourage European governments and companies to volunteer
settlement funds in preference to litigation or coercive sanctions.” Finally, the Court determined that HVIRA “conflicts”
with these policies: “California has taken a different tack of
providing regulatory sanctions to compel disclosure and payment, supplemented by a new cause of action for Holocaust
survivors if the other sanctions should fail.”
The Court refused to address whether California’s “iron fist”
approach was superior to the President’s “kid glove” approach
as it is not within its role to make such a determination.
However, it did address the state’s arguments “that even if
HVIRA does interfere with the Executive Branch foreign policy,
Congress authorized state law of this sort in the McCarranFerguson Act, . . . and the more recent U.S. Holocaust Assets
Commission Act of 1998.” The Court rejected both claims.
First, the McCarran-Ferguson Act leaves insurance regulation
generally to the States, but even if HVIRA could be considered
as a law regulating the business of insurance, “a federal statute
directed to implied preemption by domestic commerce legislation cannot sensibly be construed to address preemption by
executive conduct in foreign affairs.” Second, the Holocaust
Commission Act, set up to study and develop a historical
record of the collection and disposition of Holocaust era assets,
clearly focuses on assets held by the Government “and, if anything, the federal Act assumed it was the National
Government’s responsibility to deal with returning those
assets.” Furthermore, the reference to “compiling information”
specifically states that “to the degree information is available,”
and does not authorize “state sanctions interfering with federal
efforts to resolve such claims.”
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STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION: CIVIL
RIGHTS ACT OF 1964

A unanimous
Court . . . held that
direct evidence of
discrimination is not
required to obtain a
mixed-motive
instruction under
Title VII . . . .

A unanimous Court in
Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa42
held direct evidence of discrimination is not required
to obtain a mixed-motive
instruction under Title VII
of the Civil Right Act of
1964. The Court’s decision
in Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins43 left open the issue of when the burden of proof may
be shifted to an employer to prove the affirmative defense of
legitimate purpose in a mixed-motive case. In its 1991 Act,
Congress addressed this issue with two new provisions. The
first established an alternative for proving that an “unlawful
employment practice” occurred, allowing an employee to
move forward with his or her action once they had established
“an unlawful employment practice.”44 If discrimination is
proven, an employer can affirmatively show it would have
taken the same action even absent the impermissible factor.
The limited defense does not absolve the employer of liability,
but limits the remedies of the plaintiff.45 After the 1991 Act
was enacted, the Courts of Appeals “divided over whether a
plaintiff must prove by direct evidence that an impermissible
consideration was a ‘motivating factor.’”
In determining that direct evidence was not required, the
Court first turned to the text of the statute and determined that
section 2000e-2(m) clearly states that an employee “need only
‘demonstrate’ that an employer used a forbidden consideration
with respect to ‘any employment practice,’” not “make a heightened showing through direct evidence.” Second, the Court
concluded that Congress “explicitly defined the term ‘demonstrates’ in the 1991 Act, leaving little doubt that no special evidentiary showing is required.” Third, the Court noted that
“[t]he adequacy of circumstantial evidence also extends beyond
civil cases; we have never questioned the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence in support of a criminal conviction, even
though proof beyond a reasonable doubt is required.” Finally,
the Court also noted, that the use of the term “demonstrate” in
other provisions of Title VII tends also to show that “§ 2000e2(m) does not incorporate a direct evidence requirement.”46
CIVIL STATUTORY INTERPRETATION:
FEDERAL TRADEMARK DILUTION ACT

In Moseley v. Victoria’s Secret Catalogue, Inc.,47 the Court
determined that under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act
(FTDA), objective proof of actual injury to the economic value
of a famous mark is required for relief, as opposed to a presumption of harm arising from a subjective “likelihood of dilution” standard. In 1995, through the FTDA, Congress
amended section 43 of the Trademark Act of 1946 to provide a

45. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B).
46. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i), 2000e-5(g)(2)(B).
47. 537 U.S. 418 (2003).
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remedy for the “dilution of
famous marks.” The Court
first noted that, unlike
infringement law, dilution
law does not stem from
common law and is not
motivated by consumer
protection. Therefore, competition between the two
enterprises is irrelevant.
The Court noted that to
avoid
possible
First
Amendment
challenges,
Congress included two provisions, one to allow use of
a mark in comparative
advertising, and the other to allow the use of a mark for noncommercial use. The committee report stated that the “purpose [of the bill] is to protect famous trademarks from subsequent uses that blur the distinctiveness of the mark or tarnish
or disparage it, even in the absence of a likelihood of confusion.” The Court reasoned that the contrast between the state
statutes, which expressly refer to both “injury to business reputation” and to “dilution of the distinctive quality of a trade
name or trademark,” and the federal statute, which refers only
to the latter, supports a narrower reading of the FTDA. The relevant text of the FTDA provides that “the owner of a famous
mark is entitled to injunctive relief against another person’s
commercial use of a mark or trade name if that use ‘causes
dilution of the distinctive quality’ of the famous mark. . . .”
This text unambiguously requires a showing of actual dilution,
rather than a likelihood of dilution. The Court cautioned that
its conclusion does not mean direct proof of dilution, such as
an actual loss of sales, is always necessary; circumstantial evidence of dilution may be sufficient in a given case.

“[U]nder the
established
interpretative
canons of noscitur a
sociis and ejusdem
generis, . . . the
general words are
construed to
embrace only
objects similar in
nature . . . .

CIVIL STATUTORY INTERPRETATION:
SOCIAL SECURITY ACT

In Washington State Dept. of Social and Health Services v.
Guardianship Estate of Keffeler,48 the Court, in a unanimous
opinion written by Justice Souter, determined that the
Washington State Department of Social and Health Services
(DSHS), as payee representative to children beneficiaries of
Social Security benefits under both Social Security Income
scheme and Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance plan,
is not barred by 42 U.S.C. section 407(a) from recovering its
initial expenditures under state law for the care and maintenance of such beneficiaries in their state foster-care program.
Washington, through the DSHS, makes foster care available to
abandoned, abused, neglected, or orphaned children who have
no other guardians or custodians available. Although the state
pays for such care, it has a policy “to attempt to recover the
costs of foster care from the parents of the children.” The
department adopted a regulation providing “that public benefits for a child, including under SSI or OASDI, ‘shall be used on
behalf of the child to help pay for the cost of foster care

48. 537 U.S. 371 (2003).
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received.’” Section 407(a), commonly referred to as the “antiattachment” provision, provides, “The right of any person to
any future payment under this subchapter shall not be transferable or assignable, at law or in equity, and none of the moneys paid or payable or rights existing under this subchapter
shall be subject to execution, levy, attachment, garnishment, or
other legal process, or to the operation of any bankruptcy or
insolvency law.”
A class of children who are in the department’s foster care
and who receive OASDI or SSI benefits brought an action in
state court alleging that the “department’s use of their Social
Security benefits to reimburse itself for the costs of foster care”
violated this provision. The Court determined it does not.
The Court began by stating, “Section 407(a) protects SSI and
OASDI benefits from ‘execution, levy, attachment, garnishment, or other legal process,’” not “creditor-type acts.” It recognizes that “the questions to be answered in resolving this
case, then, do not go to the State’s character as a creditor . . .
[but to] whether the department’s effort to become a representative payee, or its use of respondents’ Social Security benefits
. . . amounts to employing an ‘execution, levy, attachment, garnishment, or other legal process.’” The Court easily dismissed
the possibilities that the state’s activities involve an “execution,
levy, attachment, or garnishment,” as these are legal “terms of
art” and refer to “formal procedures” by which a person gains
control over the property of another. The Court said “the case
boils down to whether the department’s manner of gaining
control of the federal fund involves ‘other legal process.’” The
Court determined the answer is no: “[U]nder the established
interpretative canons of noscitur a sociis and ejusdem generis,
‘where general words follow specific words in a statutory enumeration, the general words are construed to embrace only
objects similar in nature to those objects enumerated by the
preceding specific words.’” In this instance, since the phrase
“other legal process” is used after execution, levy, attachment,
and garnishment, therefore, at a minimum, section 402(a)
“would seem to require utilization of some judicial or quasijudicial mechanism . . . by which control over property passes
from one person to another.”
CIVIL STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: ERISA

In Kentucky Ass’n of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller,49 a unanimous Court, in an opinion written by Justice Scalia, found that
Kentucky’s “Any Willing Provider” statutes, which mandate
that health insurers not discriminate against willing providers,
were saved from preemption by ERISA under the new rule
adopted by the Court to determine whether a state law “regulates insurance” under 29 U.S.C. section 1144(b)(2)(A). State
laws are saved from preemption under section 1144(b)(2)(A)
if they are laws that “regulate insurance.” Making a clean
break from the McCarran-Ferguson factors it had used previously, the Court decided that “for a state law to be deemed a
‘law . . . [that] regulates insurance’ under § 1144(b)(2)(A), it
must satisfy two requirements. First, the state law must be
specifically directed toward entities engaged in insurance . . . .
Second . . . the state law must substantially affect the risk pool-

49. 123 S.Ct. 1471 (2003).

ing arrangement between the insurer and the insured.”
Although the McCarran-Ferguson factors were never an
“essential component” of the analysis surrounding section
1144(b)(2)(A), the Court had used them to “buttress” its decisions. This has “misdirected attention, failed to provide clear
guidance to lower federal courts, and . . . added little to the
relevant analysis.”
CIVIL STATUTORY INTERPRETATION:
HIGHWAY SAFETY ACT

In Pierce County v. Guillen,50 a unanimous Court found that
23 U.S.C. section 409, which protects information “compiled or
collected” in connection with certain federal highway safety
programs from being discovered or admitted into evidence, is a
valid exercise of Congress’s authority under the Commerce
Clause. The Highway Safety Act of 1966 was enacted “to
improve the safety of our Nation’s highways by encouraging
closer federal and state cooperation with respect to road
improvement projects.” This act includes the Hazard
Elimination Program, “which provides state and local governments with funding to improve the most dangerous sections of
their roads.” To implement the Hazard Elimination Program,
Congress adopted section 409 to protect certain data from discovery. The Court analyzes the scope of section 409 with
regards to two well-recognized principles: (1) “Evidentiary
privileges must be construed narrowly because privileges
impede the search for the truth,” and (2) “‘When Congress acts
to amend a statute, we presume it intends its amendment to
have real and substantial effect.’” With these principles in
mind, the Court concluded section 409 protects all documents
“compiled or collected for § 152 purposes, but does not protect
information that was originally compiled or collected for purposes unrelated to § 152 and that is currently held by the agencies that compiled or collected it, even if the information was at
some point ‘collected’ by another agency for § 152 purposes.”
After determining the scope of section 409, the Court
addressed its constitutionality. Relying on the Commerce
Clause and Congress’s “well established . . . [power] to ‘regulate the use of the channels of interstate commerce,’” the Court
found that “both the original § 409 and the 1995 amendment
can be viewed as legislation aimed at improving safety in the
channels of commerce and increasing protection for the instrumentalities of interstate commerce.” The adoption of section
409 was reasonable to eliminate the “unforeseen side effect of
the information-gathering requirement of § 152” and encourage “more diligent efforts to collect the relevant information,
more candid discussions of hazardous locations, better
informed decision making, and, ultimately, greater safety of the
Nation’s roads.”

Housing Act. It imposes lia“When Congress
bility on a corporation, not
creates a tort
its directors and officers, for
discrimination by one of its
action, it legislates
employees or agents. The
against a legal
respondents brought an
background of
action against the sole
shareholder, president, and
ordinary tortlicensed “officer/broker” of
related vicarious
a real estate agency, claiming
liability rules . . . .
he was “vicariously liable in
one or more of these capacities” for a real estate agent’s
discriminatory conduct. The Fair Housing Act forbids “‘any
person or other entity whose business includes engaging in residential real estate-related transactions to discriminate.’”52 It
states that a “‘person’ includes, for example, individuals, corporations, partnerships, associations, labor unions, and other
organizations,” but, it says nothing about vicarious liability.53
The Court noted that “it is well established that the Act provides for vicarious liability” as “an action brought for compensation by a victim of housing discrimination is, in effect, a tort
action.” In finding that the traditional rules of vicarious liability apply, the Court said, “When Congress creates a tort action,
it legislates against a legal background of ordinary tort-related
vicarious liability rules and consequently intends its legislation
to incorporate those rules.” Furthermore, it “found no convincing argument in support of the Ninth Circuit’s decision to
apply nontraditional vicarious liability principles.”
CIVIL STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: TRIBAL ACTIONS
UNDER 42 U.S.C. SECTION 1983

In Meyer v. Holley,51 Justice Breyer delivered the opinion for
a unanimous Court holding that the traditional principles of
vicarious liability apply to actions brought under the Fair

In Inyo County v. Paiute-Shoshone Indians of the Bishop
Community of the Bishop Colony,54 the Court held the tribe’s
complaint was not actionable under 42 U.S.C. section 1983,
because a tribe did not qualify as a “person” for the purposes of
that statute. Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the
Court, in which all the justices except Justice Stevens, who
wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment, joined. The tribe
filed a section 1983 action against the county alleging that by
acting beyond the scope of its jurisdiction and without authorization of law in executing a search warrant to obtain employment records from its casino, the county violated the tribe’s and
its corporation’s Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights and
the tribe’s right to self-government. Section 1983 permits “‘citizens’ and ‘other persons within the jurisdiction’ of the United
States to seek legal and equitable relief from ‘persons’ who,
under the color of state law, deprive them of federally protected
rights.” The Court determined, however, that a tribe is not a
“citizen” for the purposes of maintaining a section 1983 action.
The Court first turned to its decision in Will v. Michigan Dept.
of State Police,55 where it held that “a State is not a ‘person’
amenable to suit under § 1983,” and reasoned, “‘Congress did
not intend to override well-established immunities or defenses

50. 537 U.S. 129 (2003).
51. 537 U.S. 280 (2003).
52. 42 U.S.C. § 3605(a).

53. 42 U.S.C. § 3602(d).
54. 537 U.S. 701 (2003).
55. 491 U.S. 58 (1989).
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under the common law,’
including ‘the doctrine of sovereign immunity.’” The Court
recognized that the present
case did not necessarily fit
within this holding, but determined, with the agreement of
the parties, that tribes, like
states, “are not subject to suit
under § 1983.” With this
determination in place, the
Court focused on the issue as presented by the parties and said
that “[a]s we have recognized in other contexts, qualification of
a sovereign as a ‘person’ who may maintain a particular claim
for relief depends not ‘upon bare analysis of the word person,’
but on the ‘legislative environment’ in which the word
appears.’” The Court concluded, “Section 1983 was designed
to secure private rights against government encroachment, not
to advance a sovereign’s prerogative to withhold evidence relevant to a criminal investigation.” Therefore, the Court said,
“[W]e hold that the Tribe may not sue under § 1983 to vindicate the sovereign right it here claims.”

[A] 7-2 Court
held a shareholderdirector may
qualify as an
“employee” under
the American with
Disabilities Act.

EMPLOYMENT LAW:
FEDERAL EMPLOYERS’ LIABILITY ACT (FELA)

In Norfolk & Western Railway Co. v. Ayers,56 Justice Ginsburg
delivered the opinion of the Court, which held: (1) mental
anguish damages are recoverable under the Federal Employers’
Liability Act (FELA) by an employee suffering from actionable
asbestosis if the claim is part of asbestos-related pain and suffering damages and the fear is genuine and serious; and (2) a
railroad employer is not entitled to reduction in damages for
the contributory negligence of a non-railroad employer.
Section 1 of FELA57 “renders common carrier railroads ‘liable in
damages to any person suffering injury while . . . employed . . .
if the injury or death resulted in whole or in part from the [carrier’s] negligence.’” With respect to a claim under FELA,
“Congress did away with several common-law tort defenses
that had effectively barred recovery by injured workers.”
Turning to its decisions in Consolidated Rail Corporation v.
Gottshall,58 and Metro-North Commuter R.R. v. Buckley,59 the
Court said that “stand-alone emotional distress claims not provoked by any physical injury, for which recovery is sharply circumscribed by the zone-of-danger test; and emotional distress
claims brought on by a physical injury, for which pain and suffering recovery is permitted.” The Court concluded, therefore,
that plaintiffs who suffer from asbestosis, but not cancer, can
recover damages for fear of cancer under FELA without proof
of physical manifestations of the claimed emotional distress
with two important caveats: first, it must be a part of his
“asbestosis-related pain and suffering damages,” and second, he
must “prove that his alleged fear is genuine and serious.”
The Court next considered the second issue in the case:

56.
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59.
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whether the trial court “erred in instructing the jury ‘not to
make a deduction [from the damages awards] for the contribution of non-railroad [asbestos] exposures’ to the asbestosis
claimants’ injuries,” and concluded that it did not. The statutory language supports the trial court’s instructions: “Every
common carrier by railroad while engaging in [interstate commerce], shall be liable in damages to any person suffering
injury while he is employed by such carrier . . . for such injury
. . . resulting in whole or in part form the negligence of . . .
such carrier.”60 The Court said the conclusion that “FELA
does not mandate apportionment is also in harmony with this
Court’s repeated statements that joint and several liability is
the traditional rule.”
EMPLOYMENT LAW: AMERICAN WITH DISABILITIES ACT

In Clackamas Gastroenterology Associates, P.C. v. Wells,61
Justice Stevens, delivering the opinion for a 7-2 Court, held a
shareholder-director may qualify as an “employee” under the
American with Disabilities Act (ADA). The Court determined
that the question was answered by applying common-law principles of the master-servant relationship and determining
whether that person acts independently and participates in the
managing of the organization, or whether the individual is subject to the organization’s control. Referencing its decision in
Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. Darden,62 the Court stated,
“When Congress has used the term ‘employee’ without defining it, we have concluded that Congress intended to describe
the conventional master-servant relationship as understood by
common-law agency doctrine.” The ADA does not provide
much insight and “simply states that an ‘employee’ is ‘an individual employed by an employer.’” Therefore, the Court will
look to common-law principles to define the term. At common law, which is in accord with the view of the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission, the relevant factors
defining the master-servant relationship focus on the master’s
control over the servant.
The Court rejected the argument that it should answer the
question by asking whether the shareholder-director appears
to be the functional equivalent of a partner, concluding partnerships may include hundreds of members, “some of whom
may well qualify as ‘employees’ because control is concentrated
in a small number of managing partners.” Furthermore, the
Court determined that the Ninth Circuit’s view, which did
indeed pay “particular attention to ‘the broad purpose of the
ADA,’” could not be adopted because it ignored two important
considerations: (1) “the congressional decision to limit the
coverage of the legislation to firms with 15 or more employees
has its own justification that must be respected—namely, easing entry into the market and preserving the competitive positions of smaller firms” and (2) “congressional silence often
reflects an expectation that courts will look to the common law
to fill gaps.”

60. 45 U.S.C. § 51.
61. 123 S.Ct. 1673 (2003).
62. 503 U.S. 318 (1992).

THE JUDICIARY: FEDERAL MAGISTRATE ACT OF 1979

In Roell v. Withrow,63 a 5-4 Court held that a party’s consent
to having any or all proceedings in a civil matter held before a
magistrate judge under 28 U.S.C. section 636(c)(1) does not
need to be express and may be inferred from a party’s conduct
during litigation. Justice Souter delivered the opinion of the
Court. The Court first concluded that 28 U.S.C. section
636(c)(2) and Rule 73(b) require “advance, written consent
communicated to the clerk” by the parties for a magistrate
judge to hear the proceedings. However, given the language of
the statute and the Rule, the Court concludes that, aside from
the fact that § 636(c)(2) and Rule 73(b) require specific written consent and that neither of these provisions are only “advisory,” “the text and structure of the section as a whole suggest
that a defect in the referral to a full-time magistrate judge
under § 636(c)(2) does not eliminate that magistrate judge’s
‘civil jurisdiction’ under § 636(c)(1) so long as the parties have
in fact voluntarily consented.”
THE JUDICIARY: ARTICLE IV JUDGES

In Nguyen v. United States,64 a 5-4 Court, in an opinion written by Justice Stevens, held an appellate panel consisting of
two Article III judges and one Article IV judge did not constitute an appropriate panel. Petitioners, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
section 1294(4), appealed their convictions in a federal district
court to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Two of the
three judges on the panel were Ninth Circuit Article III judges
and the third judge, the Chief Judge of the District Court for
the Northern Mariana Islands, was an Article IV judge.
Petitioners did not challenge the make-up of the panel until
their petition for certiorari before the Court. The Court began
with “the congressional grant of authority permitting, in certain circumstances, the designation of district judges to serve
on the court of appeals.” The statute, 28 U.S.C. section 292(a),
authorizes “the chief judge of a circuit to assign ‘one or more
district judges within the circuit’ to sit on the Court of Appeals
‘whenever the business of that court so requires.’” The statute
“does not explicitly define the ‘district judges’ who may be
assigned to the Court of Appeals.” The Court concluded, however, that other provisions of law make it perfectly clear that
Article IV judges are not included. The Court also concludes
that petitioners’ failure to raise the issue earlier in the proceedings did not bar the claim. The Court said that it was confronted with a “fundamental” question of “judicial authority”
in this case. The appointment is one that “could never have
been taken at all,” not one “which could have been taken, if
properly pursued.” It was impermissible from the start and
was not a waivable error.
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Ninth Circuit reversed the
BIA’s holding, determining
the evidence “compelled” such a contrary finding and, furthermore, “changed country conditions,” which were not considered by the BIA, warranted a different result. In reversing
and remanding the case to the BIA for consideration of this
issue in the first instance, the Court determined the ordinary
remand rules applied and the Ninth Circuit’s decision not to
remand the case “seriously disregarded the agency’s legallymandated role” and “independently created potentially farreaching legal precedent about the significance of political
change in Guatemala,” without giving the BIA the opportunity
to address it first.
ELECTIONS: JUDICIAL REDISTRICTING

In a per curiam decision, the Court in Immigration and
Naturalization Service v. Ventura65 held that the Ninth Circuit
should have applied the ordinary rules of review and remanded
the case to the Bureau of Immigration Appeals for its consid-

In Branch v. Smith,66 Justice Scalia wrote the opinion for the
Court, holding a district court could, pursuant to 2 U.S.C. section 2c, create a redistricting plan instead of ordering at-large
elections pursuant to 2 U.S.C. section 2a(c)(5). Mississippi
failed to create and submit for preclearance a redistricting plan
after the 2000 census. In anticipation of the March 1, 2002
state deadline for the qualification of candidates, “Beatrice
Branch and others filed suit in a Mississippi State Chancery
Court in October 2001, asking the state court to issue a redistricting plan for the 2002 congressional elections.” In
November 2001, John Smith filed a similar suit in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi,
“claiming that the current district plan, dividing the State into
five, rather than four congressional districts, was unconstitutional and unenforceable.” He also asked the court to enjoin
the state court’s redistricting plan. Initially, the district court
declined to act, but, when it became clear that no new plan
would be forthcoming, it “enjoined the State from using the
Chancery Court plan and ordered use of the District Court’s
own plan in the 2002 elections and all succeeding elections
until the State produced a constitutional redistricting plan that
was precleared.”
The Court addressed the issue of “whether . . . the District
Court was governed by the provisions of 2 U.S.C. § 2c; or . . .
by provisions of 2 U.S.C. § 2a(c)(5).” The Court wrote, “The
tension between these two provisions is apparent: Section 2c
requires States entitled to more than one Representative to
elect their Representatives from single-member districts, rather
than from multimember districts or the State at large. Section

63. 538 U.S. 580 (2003).
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2a(c), however, requires multimember districts or at-large
elections in certain situations.”
The Court recognized that prior
to the enactment of section 2c,
many district courts reviewing
redistricting plans “had suggested that if the state legislature was unable to redistrict to
correct malapportioned congressional districts, they would
order the State’s entire congressional delegation to be elected at
large.” The Court concluded, “With all this threat of judicially
imposed at-large elections, and (as far as we are aware) no
threat of legislatively imposed change to at-large elections, it is
most unlikely that § 2c was directed solely at legislative reapportionment.” In support of this conclusion, the Court said
that “every court that has addressed the issue has held that §
2c requires courts, when they are remedying a failure to redistrict constitutionally, to draw single-member districts whenever possible.”

[T]he Court
held that it was
a matter for the
arbitrator to
interpret and
apply rules of
the NASD.

ELECTIONS: SECTION 5 OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT—
PRECLEARANCE

In Georgia v. Ashcroft,67 the Court, in an opinion written by
Justice O’Connor, decided that when determining whether a
redistricting plan results in a retrogression of a minority
group’s “effective electoral franchise,” a court must look at the
plan on a statewide basis and make a determination in light of
the totality of circumstances, not only whether a minority
group can elect the candidate of its choice. After the 2000 census, Georgia created a senate redistricting plan and sought preclearance pursuant to section 5 of the Voting Rights Act by filing an action for a declaratory judgment in the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia. The district court,
after having reviewed ample evidence from both sides, “held
that Georgia’s State Senate apportionment violated § 5, and was
therefore not entitled to preclearance.” The Supreme Court
reversed on the grounds that the district court had failed to
consider all the relevant factors when examining whether
Georgia’s Senate plan resulted in a retrogression of black voters’ effective exercise of the electoral franchise. The Court
noted that section 5 “has a limited substantive goal: ‘to
[e]nsure that no voting-procedure changes would be made that
would lead to a retrogression in the position of racial minorities with respect to their effective exercise of the electoral franchise.’” To determine if the plan should be precleared, a court
must determine whether the plan leads to a retrogression in
the position of racial minorities with respect to their effective
exercise of the “electoral franchise,” a concept the Court
undertook to delineate for the first time in this case.
First, the Court concluded that “in examining whether the
new plan is retrogressive, the inquiry must encompass the
entire statewide plan as a whole.” Second, “any assessment of
the retrogression of a minority group’s effective exercise of the
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electoral franchise depends on an examination of all the relevant circumstances,” i.e., “assessing a minority group’s opportunity to participate in the political process.” The Court noted
that the “totality of the circumstances” is not limited to “the
comparative ability of a minority group to elect a candidate of
its choice.” The Court pointed to another factor important for
consideration—“the extent to which a new plan changes the
minority group’s opportunity to participate in the political
process.” Last, the Court said that in “assessing the minority
group’s opportunity to participate in the political process,” a
court can “examine the comparative position of legislative
leadership, influence, and power for representatives of the
benchmark majority-minority districts.”
IMMIGRATION: DETENTION PRIOR TO
REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS

In Demore v. Kim,68 the Court reviewed and upheld the constitutionality of section 236(c) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act,69 which provides that “the Attorney General
shall take into custody any alien who is removable from this
country because he has been convicted of one of a specified set
of crimes.” Forgoing a hearing to determine whether he was
covered by section 1226(c), respondent filed a petition for
habeas corpus attacking the constitutionality of section
1226(c). Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, found the
provision constitutional. The majority began by noting the
statute, which “mandates detention during removal proceedings for a limited class of deportable aliens—including those
convicted of an aggravated felony,” was adopted “against a
backdrop of wholesale failure by the INS to deal with increasing rates of criminal activity by aliens.” In the end, “Congress
enacted 8 U.S.C. § 1226, requiring the Attorney General to
detain a subset of deportable criminal aliens pending a determination of their removability.” The Court followed by stating, “‘In the exercise of its broad power over naturalization and
immigration, Congress regularly makes rules that would be
unacceptable if applied to citizens.’” While “[i]t is well established that the Fifth Amendment entitles aliens to due process
of law in deportation proceedings,” the Court, nonetheless, has
recognized “detention during deportation proceedings as a
constitutionally valid aspect of the deportation process.”
OTHER SIGNIFICANT DECISIONS: INDIAN TUCKER ACT

In United States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe,70 the Court
held the 1960 Act creating a tribal trust in favor of the White
Mountain Apache Tribe gives rise to Indian Tucker Act jurisdiction in the Court of Federal Claims over the tribe’s suit for
money damages against the United States. In 1960, Congress
enacted a statute that provides that the “‘former Fort Apache
Military Reservation’ would be ‘held by the United States in
trust for the White Mountain Apache Tribe, subject to the right
of the Secretary of the Interior to use any part of the land and
improvements for administrative or school purpose.’” In 1993,
the tribe “commissioned an engineering assessment of the
property, resulting in a finding that as of 1998 it would cost

69. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c).
70. 537 U.S. 465 (2003).

about $14 million to rehabilitate the property occupied by the
Government . . . .” In 1999, the tribe sued the United States in
the Court of Federal Claims claiming damages in this amount,
“citing the terms of the 1960 Act, among others, and alleging
breach of fiduciary duty to ‘maintain, protect, repair, and preserve’ the trust property.” The Court of Federal Claims dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
because under the Tucker Act, which invests the Court of
Federal Claims with jurisdiction over action by tribes against
the United States, the waiver of sovereign immunity is only
applicable “when underlying substantive law could fairly be
interpreted as giving rise to a particular duty, breach of which
should be compensable in money damages.” In a 5-4 decision,
the Court, with Justice Souter writing for the majority, reversed.
The Court first recited the basic rules of subject matter
jurisdiction: “Jurisdiction over any suit against the
Government requires a clear statement from the United States
waiving sovereign immunity.” The Tucker Act contains such a
waiver “giving the Court of Federal Claims jurisdiction to
award damages upon proof of ‘any claims against the United
States founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of
Congress.’”71 The Indian Tucker Act72 “confers a like waiver
for Indian tribal claims that ‘otherwise would be cognizable in
the Court of Federal Claims if the claimant were not an Indian
tribe.’” The Court then noted that “[n]either Act, however,
creates a substantive right enforceable against the Government
by a claim of money damages.” However, the 1960 Act creates
such a right, providing a “fair inference that an obligation to
preserve the property improvements was incumbent on the
United States as trustee” based on “elementary trust law,”
which “confirms the commonsense assumption that a fiduciary actually administering trust property may not allow it to
fall into ruin on his watch.”

parties would likely expect that an arbitrator would decide the
gateway matter. Thus procedural questions that grow out of
the dispute and bear on its final disposition are presumptively
not for the judge, but for an arbitrator to decide. The Court
concluded that the NASD time limit rule closely resembles the
gateway questions that the Court has found not to be “questions of arbitrability,” but a question presumptively for the
arbitrator to decide.
OTHER SIGNIFICANT DECISIONS:
SUPREME COURT JURISDICTION

OTHER SIGNIFICANT DECISIONS:
ARBITRATION AND JUDICIAL REVIEW

In Nike, Inc. v. Kasky,74 the Supreme Court initially granted
certiorari to decide two questions: (1) “whether a corporation
participating in a public debate may ‘be subjected to liability
for factual inaccuracies on the theory that its statements are
commercial speech because they might affect consumers’ opinions about the business as a good corporate citizen and thereby
affect their purchasing decisions,’” and (2) assuming it was
commercial speech, “whether the First Amendment permits
subjecting speakers to the legal regime approved” by the
California Supreme Court. After 34 briefs were submitted and
oral argument heard, the Court decided to dismiss the writ “as
improvidently granted.” Justice Stevens, with whom Justice
Ginsburg joined, and Justice Souter joined only as to part,
wrote to concur in the dismissal because he said that “the
Court’s decision to dismiss the writ of certiorari is supported
by three independently sufficient reasons: (1) the judgment
entered by the California Supreme Court was not final within
the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1257; (2) neither party has standing to invoke the jurisdiction of a federal court; and (3) the
reasons for avoiding the premature adjudication of novel constitutional questions apply with special force to this case.”
Justice Breyer, dissenting, wrote that in his view, “under similar circumstances, the Court has found that failure to review an
interlocutory order entails ‘an inexcusable delay of the benefits
[of appeal] Congress intended to grant.’”

In Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.,73 Justice Breyer
delivered the opinion of the Court. Here, the Court held that it
was a matter for the arbitrator to interpret and apply rules of
the NASD. In this action, an arbitration agreement was in
place between the parties that allowed the petitioner to choose
the forum. She did, choosing the National Association of
Securities Dealers (NASD) and signing the NASD’s uniform
submission agreement, which stipulates that no dispute shall
be eligible for submission after six years has elapsed.
Respondent filed an action in the district court arguing that the
six-year time period had lapsed. The Court began by stating
“the ‘question of arbitrability,’ is ‘an issue for judicial determination unless the parties clearly and unmistakably provide
otherwise.’” The “question of arbitrability” as a “gateway dispute” hinges on whether the parties would have been likely to
expect a court to have decided the gateway matter. At the same
time, the Court has found the phrase “question of arbitrability”
not applicable in other kinds of general circumstance where
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